Privatizing Eminent Domain: The Delegation of a Very Public Power to Private
Non-Profit and Charitable Corporations
Abstract
In an age of privatization of many governmental functions such as health care,
prison management, and warfare, this Article poses the question as to whether eminent
domain should be among them. Unlike other privatized functions, eminent domain is a
traditionally governmental and highly coercive power, akin to the government’s power to
tax, to arrest individuals, and to license. It is, therefore, a very public power.
In particular, the delegation of this very public power to private, non-profit and
charitable corporations has escaped the scrutiny that for-profit private actors have
attracted in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo. Though delegated
the very public power of eminent domain, these private, non-profit actors may only be
accountable to their private boards of directors instead of to the general electorate.
This Article asserts that the largely procedural due process underpinnings of the
Private Non-Delegation Doctrine (PNDD), a doctrine that has enjoyed renewed vigor in
the state courts, provides an excellent means to assess the delegation of the takings power
to private, non-profit corporations. The paper introduces two PNDD tests and applies
these tests to two case studies in which eminent domain power has been delegated to
private non-profits. Finally, in order to address the procedural due process concerns
stressed by the PNDD and the two judicial tests, this Article proposes seven legislative
solutions, including the use of Social Capital Impact Assessments, for state legislatures
that have either delegated the takings power to private, non-profits, or that are
contemplating these delegations.
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Privatizing Eminent Domain: The Delegation of a Very Public Power to Private, NonProfit and Charitable Corporations
Asmara Tekle Johnson1
I. Introduction
It is no secret that federal and state governments increasingly contract out a
number of responsibilities and functions to private parties, from prison management2 to
health care3 to warfare.4 It is fathomable that almost any governmental function could be
outsourced to a private party.5 However, should eminent domain, often viewed as the
most public of powers,6 be among them?
This question fundamentally arises in the context in the delegation of the takings
power to private, non-profit or charitable corporations that may be accountable to no one
but a board of directors and private donors, and least of all the general electorate. In the
1

The author is a Visiting Associate Professor of Law at Thurgood Marshall School of Law at Texas
Southern University. J.D., 2000, Cornell Law School; A.B. cum laude, 1995 Harvard College. The author
would like to thank Fabiola Cagigal-Acciarri for her invaluable research and editorial assistance. In addition, the
author is indebted to Professors Tom Kleven and Walter Champion, J’Antae D. Hall, Timothy L. Johnson, and
the participants of the 2006 annual meeting of the Midwestern People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference,
especially to Professor Linda R. Crane, for her helpful commentary.
2
See David N. Wecht, Note, Breaking the Code of Deference: Judicial Review of Private Prisons, 96
YALE L.J. 815, 818 (1987) (“Private for-profit firms now operate approximately two dozen major facilities,
including at least three medium or maximum security adult correctional institutions.”); see also Ira P.
Robbins, The Impact of the Delegation Doctrine on Prison Privatization, 35 UCLA L.REV. 911, 911-12
(1988) (noting that prison overcrowding is “pervasive” and that privatizing correctional facilities has been
proposed to reduce the overcrowding problem).
3
See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U.L. REV. 543, 552 (2000) (stating
that “[i]n the last half century, the private nonprofit sector has become the primary mechanism for
delivering government-financed human services, such as health care.”). In addition, the article goes on to
note that outside of health care, local governments have also contracted out their waste management and
highway construction services. Id.
4
Daniel Bergner, The Other Army, N.Y.TIMES, Aug. 14, 2005, at 29. ("Private gunmen . . . are now
guarding four U.S. generals . . . . [a]nd throughout Iraq, the defense of essential military sites like depots of
captured munitions has been informally shared by private soldiers and U.S. troops. If the 25,000 figure is
accurate, the [private] businesses add about 16 percent to the coalition's total forces.").
5
David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 IND. L.J. 647, 647-48 (1986) (noting
that “almost any power or function exercised by a government, particularly a state or local government, can
also be exercised, unremarked, by some clearly private actor.”).
6
See id. at 648 (“Accepting some fuzziness at the edges, we do recognize certain powers as essentially
governmental: rulemaking, adjudication of rights, seizure of person or property, licensing and taxation.
These powers share the element of coercion, of making someone do something he does not choose to do or
preventing him from doing what he wishes to do.”) (emphasis added); see also Louis L. Jaffe, An Essay on
Delegation of Legislative Power: II, 47 COLUM. L.REV. 561, 586 (1947) (“It is when delegated power
affects the use of real property or the practice of a profession that the judicial nerve tingles.”).
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wake of Kelo v. City of New London,7 for-profit private entities have garnered the most
attention from legislators and the public, given the benefits that may accrue to them when
government uses takings as part of an “integrated”8 or “comprehensive”9 economic
development plan.

These plans may provide revenue expansion to for-profit

corporations, but also to the public in the form of increased property and sales tax
revenues and additional jobs. Despite all the attention that Kelo generated towards the
part played by for-profit corporations in the eminent domain arena, private non-profit and
charitable corporations that have been delegated the takings power by state legislatures,
have managed to slip under the public’s and lawmakers’ eminent domain radar screen.
These non-profit entities have evaded the sort of scrutiny and detection that not only
government, but also private for-profit corporations, that may exercise significant
influence upon government in takings,10 have historically attracted as a matter of course.
As a preliminary matter, this Article will use the term “private, non-profit
corporations” as a global term for non-profit and charitable corporations, as well as for
charitable organizations and urban redevelopment corporations. The common link in the
nomenclature is that these corporations are largely organized for a purpose outside of

7

Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in which
Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. Justice O’Connor authored a dissenting opinion in
which Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas joined. Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurring opinion, and
Justice Thomas filed a separate dissenting opinion.
8
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2666-67.
9
Id. at 2668.
10
See, e.g., regarding Kelo and the residents in New London, Ted Mann, Pfizer’s Fingerprints on Fort
Trumbull Plan, THE DAY, Oct. 16, 2005, at A1, Jane Ellen Dee, Oh, Claire You’re a Scholar and a Visionary....If
Only You Could Quit Leaving Skin on the Sidewalk, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 25, 2001, at 5.; see also Barry
Yeoman,
Whose
House
Is
It
Anyway?,
AARP
Magazine
Online,
Nov.
3,
2005,
http://www.aarpmagazine.org/money/whose _house_is_it_anyway.html.
(discussing the outcry against the

City of New London and Pfizer Corporation upon the city’s decision to use eminent domain to acquire
parcels of land in the Fort Trumbull neighborhood). Another infamous example is found in Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981) (upholding a Michigan quick-take
statute that allowed the city of Detroit to take land in the Poletown neighborhood and to transfer it to General
Motors for the construction of a Cadillac auto plant because the public benefits promised by the plant were
substantial); see also Elizabeth F. Gallagher, Note, Breaking New Ground: Using Eminent Domain for
Economic Development, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1868 (2005) (discussing that residents in Poletown banded
together to form the Poletown Neighborhood Council to contest the takings and noting that, in Kelo, property
owners who opposed the takings organized to file a lawsuit).
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engendering profits for shareholders. Their purpose is geared towards charitable or
benevolent aims.11 Secondly, these corporations are largely entitled to favorable tax
treatment.12
This paper will also assert that the largely procedural due process underpinnings
of the Private Non-Delegation Doctrine (PNDD) may be used to assess the delegation of
eminent domain power to non-profit and charitable corporations by state legislatures.
The PNDD has enjoyed renewed vigor in the state courts after having been last used by
the Court in the New Deal era and remaining essentially dormant in the federal courts
since that time. Further, by using PNDD analysis to examine the statutory controls and
legislative delegations in two case studies, in which states have delegated the takings
power to non-profit and charitable corporations, this paper will also propose seven
statutory procedural due process mechanisms for use by states that have delegated, or are
contemplating delegating, the takings power with little or no accountability controls or
safeguards.
Accordingly, Part II of this Article will explain the PNDD and the Doctrine’s
nexus to eminent domain. Part III will then examine the rationales for the delegation of
the takings power to non-profit and charitable corporations and arguments weighing
against those delegations.

Part III will also discuss the principles supporting and

disfavoring the wholesale abolishment of the delegation of eminent domain power to
private, non-profit and charitable corporations.
11

Part IV of this Article will explore

For instance, Black’s Law Dictionary defines a non-profit corporation as “a corporation organized for
some purpose other than making a profit, and usually afforded special tax treatment—[a]lso termed notfor-profit corporation.” Black’s Law Dictionary 343 (7th Ed. 1999). In addition, Black’s Law Dictionary
defines a charitable corporation as “[a] nonprofit corporation that is dedicated to benevolent purposes and
thus entitled to special tax status under the Internal Revenue Code—[a]lso termed eleemosynary
corporation.” Id. Finally, the same source describes a charitable organization as a “[a] tax-exempt
organization that (1) is organized and operated exclusively for religious, scientific, literary, educational,
athletic, public-safety, or community-service purposes, (2) does not distribute earnings for the benefit of
private individuals, and (3) does not participate in any political candidate campaigns, or engage in
substantial lobbying.” (citing Internal Revenue Code, I.R.C. § 501(c) (3)). Id.
12
See id.
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notions of procedural due process as applied to the delegation of the takings power to
private, non-profit corporations and assess arguments favoring the use of these due
process principles in this area. Part IV will similarly introduce two PNDD tests largely
derived from procedural due process, and it will consider a substantive due process
approach to the private delegation of the takings power to non-profit corporations. Part V
will then present the two case studies and apply the PNDD tests to each. Part VI will
propose the seven legislative solutions, including Social Capital Impact Assessments
(SCIAs), that may be used to address any procedural due process failings of private
delegations of the public takings power. Part VII will conclude this paper.
II.

The Private Non-Delegation Doctrine (PNDD)
A. History

In the federal courts, the general Non-Delegation Doctrine enjoyed a vibrant but
brief renaissance from 1935 to 1936 when in three cases, the U.S. Supreme Court
invoked the Doctrine to strike down federal legislation that had delegated power to
federal agencies and to private parties.13 In instances where power had been delegated to
federal agencies, the Public Non-Delegation Doctrine was invoked, while instances
concerning delegation of power to private parties referenced the Private Non-Delegation
Doctrine.14 Since then, however, the Supreme Court has yet to invalidate delegations on

13

Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (invalidating a portion of the National Industry Recovery
Act that delegated to the Executive the power to enact codes of fair competition in the petroleum and
petroleum products industry in an effort to help the industry recover from the Great Depression), A.L.A.
Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking down Congress’ delegation of power
to the Executive pursuant to the National Industry Recovery Act to regulate working hours, minimum pay,
and workplace standards in the live poultry industry in the New York City metropolitan area, also in an
effort to revitalize this segment of the economy after hard economic times), and Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
298 U.S. 238 (1936) (overturning the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 that called for the
delegation of power to private producers of coal that elected 23 boards to set minimum coal prices for each
district and that also set pay rates and working hours for mining workers. Coal producers that chose not to
participate in the boards were subject to a 15 percent assessment on their sales of coal.).
14
See id.
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Doctrine grounds, 15 and the federal appellate and district courts have generally followed
suit.16 While there is an argument that the Non-Delegation Doctrine might be a deadletter at the federal level,17 many commentators have noted that there is still yet hope, as
the Court has not yet rejected it outright.18

For example, the Doctrine occasionally

receives approving nods of attention in various Court opinions.19 In contrast, however,

15

See Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn, & Glen O. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 10 (1982) (noting that Panama Ref. Co., Schecter, and Carter Coal proved to be “the
Supreme Court’s last and only applications of the doctrine to overturn congressional acts.”); see also A.
Michael Froomkin, Thirtieth Annual Administrative Law Issue Governance of the Internet: Article Wrong
Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 155
(2000) (“But while the Supreme Court has had no modern opportunities to revisit the private nondelegation
doctrine . . . .”) and Carl McGowan, Congress, Court, and Control of Delegated Power, 77 COLUM. L. REV.
1119, 1127 (1977) (“Despite broad statements to this effect, however, the Supreme Court has never
invalidated a congressional enactment on so sweeping a ground [the Non-Delegation Doctrine]-nor could it
today without, in Professor Davis’ words, invalidating ‘approximately one hundred percent of federal
legislation conferring rulemaking authority on federal agencies . . . .’”).
16
See Lawrence, supra note 5, at 648 (noting that, in reference to the PNDD, “[s]ince Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., decided a half-century ago, the federal courts have consistently allowed delegations of federal power
to private actors.”). But see American Trucking Ass’n v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per
curiam) (noting that provisions of the Clean Air Act giving the Environmental Protection Agency the right
to promulgate air quality standards nationwide was an unconstitutional delegation of power) (opinion
modified on rehearing) (D.C. Cir. 1999). Professor Cass Sunstein, however, notes that this decision by the
D.C. Circuit represents the “birth of a new [public] nondelegation doctrine” in which agencies articulate
specific “governing legal criteria” for the decisions they make.” Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act
Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH. L. REV. 303, 310 (1999), and Industrial Union Department v. American
Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 684 (1980) (the “Benzene" case) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (writing
that certain provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act was an unconstitutional public delegation
of power).
17
See, e.g., DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION COST
POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPERATE POWERS 20 (1999) (stating that “[t]he
nondelegation doctrine is now moribund, although various law review articles try to breathe life into it
every so often.”), Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000) (citing JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 132-33 (Harvard 1980) for the
proposition that the nondelegation doctrine is “dead.”), and George W. Liebmann, Delegation to Private
Parties in American Constitutional Law, 50 IND. L.J. 650, 716 (1975) (referring to the Non-Delegation
Doctrine as “nonsense”).
18
See Froomkin, supra note 15, at 155 (discussing, with respect to the Private Non-Delegation Doctrine,
that “there is reason to believe that Carter Coal’s fundamental limit on delegations of public power to
private groups retains its validity. Admittedly, the formal clues are sparse. While never overturned, postSchecter Poultry Supreme Court commentary on Carter Coal is rare.”) (emphasis added); see also Aranson,
supra note 15, at 12 (“Despite the Court’s reluctance to apply this ‘nondoctrine,’ it has refused to repudiate
it completely. Periodically, the nondelegation principle receives favorable mention in opinions of the Court
and in those of individual justices. "); Sunstein, supra note 16, at 315-17 (stating that the Public NonDelegation Doctrine is “alive and well,” and lives on in the federal courts in a series of “canons of
construction” that are easier for the federal courts to administer and are less unwieldy for them, but that
equally reinforce traditional notions of representative democracy).
19
See id.
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the state courts have been fertile ground for overturning state legislation on NonDelegation Doctrine grounds.20
B. Judicial Reluctance and the Private Delegation of Public Power
Courts find delegations of public power to private actors more problematic than
delegations to public authorities or agencies, as there is less opportunity to hold private
actors accountable at the ballot box for the choices they make with the power delegated
to them.21 Indeed, in a New Deal case, Carter Coal, the Court overturned federal
legislation that had delegated the power to regulate wages, working hours, and working
conditions to certain coal producers.22

It noted that delegation to private persons “is

legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is not even delegation to an
official or an official body, presumptively disinterested, but to private persons whose
interests may be and often are adverse to the interest of others in the same business.”23
Other courts have noted, when considering delegations of power to private entities, that
these delegations are more constitutionally “troubling” and, therefore, “are subject to
more stringent requirements and less judicial deference than public delegations.”24
Some scholars have noted that the underlying reason that delegation of public
powers to private actors is more nettlesome to the judiciary is that there are some powers

20

See e.g., Froomkin, supra note 15, at 155-56 (“But while the Supreme Court has had no modern
opportunities to revisit the private nondelegation doctrine, the state courts have had that chance, and their
treatment of the issue underlines the importance of the doctrine today.”), McGowan, supra note 15, at 1128
(noting that the “nondelegation principle continues to have greater utility at the state level. . . .”), Texas
Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. 1994) (overturning the Texas
legislature’s creation of the “Official Cotton Growers’ Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation” that had the
power to assess chargers on cotton producers on PNDD grounds), and FM Properties Operating Co. v. City
of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868 (Tex. 2000) (holding that certain portions of the Texas Water Code were
unconstitutional because they delegated certain legislative powers related to water quality to landowners
owning 1,000 acres or more).
21
See Froomkin, supra note 15, at 155 (“Several courts and commentators have agreed that delegations to
private groups are more troubling than those to public agencies because the accountability mechanisms are
weaker or non-existent.”).
22
See supra note 13.
23
Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 311.
24
FM Properties, 22 S.W.3d at 874.
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that are “essentially governmental.”25

These public powers include “rulemaking,

adjudication of rights, seizure of person or property, and licensing and taxation.”26 The
common denominator between them, however, is the “element of coercion.”

27

For

instance, one who has these powers can force someone to do something that she does not
wish to do; or conversely, that same entity can force an individual not to do something
that she would like to do.28
In contrast, power generally viewed as “private,” is centered squarely within the
ability of an individual to consent to an action, and it is primarily found in contract law or
in property ownership.29 For example, a private property owner may bar or permit others
from entering her real property by caprice alone, and she may subject this admission to
certain rules of her making.30 Moreover, by virtue of her being a real property owner, she
may constrain the uses of real property in the surrounding area under nuisance law.31 In
addition, the law of contracts gives private parties the right to define rules and regulations
amongst themselves.32
Therefore, because of the coercive nature of public, or traditionally governmental
power, exemplified by a lack of consent to an action or decision by an affected
individual, governments choose generally to outsource or to privatize “ministerial or
mechanical functions” and non-coercive responsibilities.33 These services and functions
frequently include the building of roads, waste collection, or the administration of health
25

Lawrence, supra note 5, at 648.
Id.
27
Id.
28
See id.
29
See id.
30
See Note, The State Courts and Delegation of Public Authority to Private Groups, 67 HARV. L. REV.
1398, 1399 (1954).
31
See id.
32
See id.
33
Suss v. American Soc. for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 823 F.Supp. 181, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(holding that a business owner had standing to sue after officers of the American Society for the Prevention
of Cruelty to Animals, a private non-profit corporation delegated the authority by the New York legislature
to enforce state laws protecting animals, broke through a wall without a warrant into the owner’s building
to save a cat).
26
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care.34 When coercive power that is traditionally exercised by government is exercised
by private parties, it is, therefore, quite understandable that courts will scrutinize that
power much more closely because of an increased risk of abuse and arbitrariness.35
The judicial branch’s concern about the delegation of public power to private
parties, however, is much more than academic. Indeed, this concern has been borne out
in the real world, as the way in which private delegates of public power have conducted
themselves

has

proved

historically

“unsatisfactory.”36

C. PNDD’s Nexus to Eminent Domain
Although traditionally the PNDD involved the delegation of purely legislative
authority to private parties, the Doctrine, as applied to eminent domain, refers specifically
to the delegation of the takings power by the legislature to private parties.37 Indeed, in
34

See supra note 3.
See id.
36
See id. (citing W. Browne, Altgeld of Illinois ch. VIII-XIC (1924), and describing the conduct of private
detectives who were deputized as police officers during the railway strike of 1984); see also Washington v.
Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 121-22 (1928) (striking down an amendment to a zoning ordinance that required a
landowner who wanted to build a retirement center for low-income elderly residents to obtain the written
consent of two-thirds of the landowners within 400 feet of the site because the consenting landowners “are
not bound by any official duty but are free to withhold consent for selfish reasons or arbitrarily and may
subject the trustee [the landowner desiring to build the home] to their will or caprice,” thereby violating the
Due Process Clause); Jennings v. Exeter-West Greenwich Regional School District Committee, 352 A.2d
634 (R.I. 1976) (holding that a Rhode Island statute that required public school districts to bus
schoolchildren residing within the district’s boundaries to private schools unconstitutionally delegated
legislative power to private schools, as they could establish how far a privately educated child could be
bussed, regardless of whether the school was in the boundaries, and therefore how much the public school
district would have to spend for these purposes); Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d
1086, 1110-1111, 17 Cal.4th 553, 593 (Cal. 1998) (Brown, J., dissenting) (writing that the Unfair
Competition Law in California that gave ordinary citizens, not just public prosecutors, standing to sue
delegated public authority to prosecute to private citizens, thereby holding potential defendants arbitrarily
hostage to self-interested “unelected, unaccountable private enforcers, unrestrained by established notions
of concrete harm or public duty, [who] seek to advance their own agendas or deploy the law as leverage to
increase attorney fees.”).
37
See Benjamin McCorkle, Constitutional Law-Arkansas’s Nondelegation Doctrine: The Arkansas
Supreme Court Defines a Limit on the Delegation of Legislation Authority to a Private Party, Leathers v.
Gulf Rice Arkansas, Inc., 338 Ark. 425, 884 S.W.2d 481 (1999), 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 297, 299
(2000) (“The nondelegation doctrine is the judicial interpretation of what authority a legislative body can
delegate to another branch of government, administrative agencies, or non-governmental entities.”).
35
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the federal constitution38 and in many state constitutions, only government, irrespective
of the branch, may exercise the power of eminent domain - within certain parameters.
These parameters are generally that “just compensation” be paid to any property owner
and that the taking must occur for a “public use.”39
Nonetheless, as traditional governmental power goes, eminent domain ranks as
one of the top. It is essentially the power to seize real property using the power of
coercion in lieu of consent,40 making it, for good reason, a very public power that is
traditionally reserved to government.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court held in Luxton v. North River Bridge
Company that it is "beyond dispute" that Congress could constitutionally delegate the
takings power to private, for-profit companies such as private railroad corporations.41
These sorts of companies build railroads and bridges in order to further interstate
commerce and economic growth by aiding transportation.42 However, it may be argued
that this delegation of the takings power with respect to railroad companies sounds more
in Congress’ power in the Constitution to regulate commerce between the states.
Congress may also be explicitly recognizing the significant effect that these companies
have on interstate commerce and the economic growth of the country. In addition, both

38
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that “Nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. art. V.
39
The current test for whether the exercise of eminent domain satisfies the “public use” portion of the Fifth
Amendment is whether or not the exercise has a “public purpose.” See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2662-63; see also
Fallbrook Irrigation Distr. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158-64 (1896). The Supreme Court has explicitly rejected a
strict interpretation of “public use,” or a definition that comprehends the exercise of eminent domain only if the
real property seized will be used by the public. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2633.
40

See supra nn. 6, 25-32.
Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U.S. 525, 529 (1894); see also Kelo, 125 S. Ct at 2673 (U.S.
2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (explaining that one of the three categories in which the government may
transfer private property to private entities is in the case of common carriers, such as railroad companies
and utility companies that will make the property available for public use.).
42
See id.
41
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railroad and public utilities, despite being owned by private parties, neatly satisfy the
“public use” parameter of eminent domain, as they are used by the public.43
Moreover, the private, for-profit corporation at issue in Luxton was a federal
corporation, having been incorporated by Congressional act. It was, therefore, arguably a
corporation with an inherently public nature.44 In addition, some commentators have
noted that, given the impact that railroad and public utilities have on the national
economy, these private, for-profit companies should exercise eminent domain, as they
save the government “time and money.”45 Furthermore, aggrieved landowners may seek
just compensation through the judicial process.46
More importantly, public utility companies, for example, are generally highly
regulated, and they must serve any customer who qualifies for service in a nondiscriminatory manner, including being non-discriminatory in their rates.47
requirement is in contrast to other private industry.48

This

In Texas, for instance, public

utilities generally have the power of eminent domain, but regulation rules the roost- from
the rates that are charged to customers to the requirement of acquiring licenses and
franchises from state regulatory agencies and from cities, respectively, to the operation of
facilities only after a state agency’s approval.49 Also, with respect to its use of eminent
domain, Texas requires that a public utility may not run facilities on land acquired

43

See Elizabeth A. Taylor, Note, The Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative and the Power of Eminent
Domain, 36 B.C. L. REV. 1061, 1083 (1996) (citing Errol E. Meidinger, The “Public Uses” of Eminent
Domain: History and Policy, 11 ENVT. L. 1,28 (1980)).
44
See Luxton, 153 U.S. at 529 (“The validity of the act of Congress incorporating the North River Bridge
Company rests upon principles of constitutional law, now established beyond dispute.”).
45
Lawrence supra note 5, at 657 (Similarly, allowing private enterprises such as railroads to directly
exercise the power of eminent domain, saves the government time and money.”).
46
See id.
47
See Chris Reeder, Regulation by Contractors: Delegation of Legislative Power to Private Entities in
Texas, 5 TEX. TECH J. TEX. ADMIN. L. 191, 229 (2004) (noting that public utilities, though private, forprofit entities with eminent domain power have an “inherent public nature.”).
48
See id.
49
See id.
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through these coercive means unless a state agency has approved the operation.50
Finally, the approval is based on a need for the utility.51
In contrast, on balance, it may be argued that private, non-profit corporations have
no such effect on interstate commerce. What commercial interstate or intrastate effects
that may arise, and the efficiency advantages that may be promoted by delegating the
takings power to private, non-profit corporations without adequate safeguards, are
outweighed significantly by procedural concerns under the Due Process Clause and
notions of representative democracy.
Nevertheless, although it is certainly debatable whether or not a private, nonprofit actor’s exercise of eminent domain power pursuant to a delegation of the power
satisfies federal or state constitutional “public use” requirements, the issue of whether or
not the delegation of eminent domain itself to a private, non-profit actor accords with the
accountability controls and due process underpinnings of PNDD is a separate question
entirely from that of public use.52

Perhaps, as some commentators have noted, in

previous generations, when public utilities and railroads were largely the sole private
actors delegated the takings power, the idea of procedural due process controls that led to
the disinterested exercise of the power was effectively moot, given that the public’s
interest was impacted by the ability to move goods throughout the nation and access
public utilities.53 However, in today’s era, when the Court most recently has expanded

50

See id.
See id.
52
See, e.g., Texas Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 493 (Cornyn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(noting that in response to the Texas Supreme Court’s decision to strike down a delegation of legislative
power to a private non-profit, deeming it unconstitutional pursuant to a eight-step inquiry, that the court
failed to “consider the impact of its decision on the [Texas] Legislature’s common practice of delegating
eminent domain powers to private entities.”); see also FM Properties, 22 S.W.2d at 899 (Abbott, J.,
dissenting) (making a similar case in answer to the Texas Supreme Court’s holding that the Texas
legislature had unconstitutionally delegated power to private landowners to create water quality zones and
questioning how the court could “reconcile” its holding with “existing legislative grants of eminent domain
power to private entities.”).
53
See Taylor, supra note 43, at 1083.
51
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the “public use” requirement to include private economic development in Kelo, the time
may be ripe for a separate examination of delegations to private actors that rests solely on
PNDD grounds.

III. Arguments Favoring and Disfavoring the Delegation of the Takings Power to Private,
Non-Profit Corporations
A. Why Delegate Eminent Domain Power to Private, Non-Profit Corporations?
As with the Public Non-Delegation Doctrine, there are a number of arguments in
support of delegating the takings power to private, non-profit corporations. An obvious
argument is that delegating this power to private, non-profit corporations is more
efficient. Government, and therefore, taxpayers, are spared the time and expense of
having to negotiate, seize, and purchase property under eminent domain, especially from
recalcitrant landowners who may be opposed to the action.54 Instead, these costs are
passed on to the private, non-profit corporation, and taxpayers, therefore, save money.
For instance, in order to decrease the financial burden on taxpayers, a number of judges
and courts use private arbitration mechanisms in lieu of appointing public judges to hear
the same cases.55
Moreover, government tends to be bureaucratic, and corporations more supple.56
In the amount of time that it may take local government to seize property on behalf of a
private, non-profit corporation, that same non-profit, by virtue of its non-bureaucratic
nature, may have “moved on,” taking and investing with it much-needed dollars in
another community.

54

See id. Indeed, some judges and courts have supported private delegation because it favors more
“privatization” and less government “regulation” or interference. See Texas Boll Weevil, 22 S.W.3d at 899
(Abbott, J., dissenting).
55
See id.
56
See Lawrence, supra note 5, at 655.
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Furthermore, political efficiency may also warrant the delegation of eminent
domain power to private, non-profit corporations. When government decides to use its
takings power, interest groups opposed to the action may utilize the political process to
delay or to halt the taking. The reaction by the several homeowners in Kelo who were
opposed to the taking of their homes by the New London Development Corporation is a
perfect example of this situation.

Not only did the economic development plan

envisioned by the city of New London experience significant delay,57 but also the
homeowners’ actions sparked a nationwide outcry against the use of the takings power
for economic development.58

Similarly, in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of

57
William Yardley, After Eminent Domain Victory, Disputed Project Goes Nowhere, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21 2005,
at A1. In June 2006, however, New London voted, in opposition to the stance taken by Connecticut’s governor
to evict the remaining hold-outs in Fort Trumbull. See Avi Salzman, Connecticut City Takes First Step to Evict
Eminent Domain Case, NEW YORK TIMES, June 6, 2006, at B2. Furthermore, in July 2006, the city’s Planning
and Zoning Commission granted building permits for the economic development project to begin. See Elaine
Stoll, Commission Approves Hotel Suite Plan For Fort Trumbull, THE DAY, July 22, 2006, at 2B.
58

See Judy Coleman, The Powers of a Few, the Anger of the Many, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2005, at B2; see
also Timothy Egan, Rulings Sets Off Tug of War Over Private Property, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2005, at
A12. Furthermore, at last count, approximately 41 states had introduced legislation to limit the use of eminent
domain for private economic development in response to Kelo. See John M. Broder, States Curbing Right to
Seize Private Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, at A1. For instance, in California alone, five constitutional
amendments and eight proposed pieces of legislation have been put before the California Legislature to counter
the Court’s decision in Kelo. In Texas, the legislature acted swiftly and banned the use of eminent domain on
behalf of a private party, except for certain uses. Among these exceptions is the taking of land for a new stadium
for the Dallas Cowboys football team. In addition, in Ohio, the legislature placed a one-year moratorium on all
takings soon after the Kelo ruling. See id.; see also Dennis Cauchon, States Eye Land Seizure Limits, USA
TODAY, Feb. 20, 2006, at 1A (noting the one-year moratorium in Ohio); see generally Terry Pristin, Developers
Can't Imagine a World Without Eminent Domain, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2006, at C5 (discussing different
measures that states have taken in response to Kelo and noting the opposition to the legislative groundswell from
developers, some lawmakers, and the real estate community). With respect to action taken on the federal level,
as of November 30, 2005, legislation was passed by Congress and signed into law by the President that makes
appropriations for certain government agencies and provides that no funds shall be used for federal, state, or local
projects that seek to use the power of eminent domain for economic development that would primarily benefit
private parties. See Transportation, Treasury, and Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, the District of
Columbia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-115, § 726, 119 Stat. 2396,
2494-2495 (2005). Furthermore, the U.S. House of Representatives recently passed H.R. 4128, a bill that
proposes to prevent states and their political subdivisions from receiving federal economic development funds
for two years if a court of competent jurisdiction rules that eminent domain has been used for economic
development. Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 4128, 109th Cong. § 2(b) (2005). The same
legislation also allows not only for individuals to sue local or federal government to enforce any provision of the
proposed law, but also for the awarding of attorney’s fees should a plaintiff prevail. Id. § 4(a), (c). It also
prevents the federal government from using eminent domain for economic development. Id. § 3. The proposed
law broadly defines economic development as, “taking private property, without the consent of the owner, and
conveying or leasing such property from one private person or entity to another private person or entity for
commercial enterprise carried on for profit, or to increase tax revenue, tax base, employment, or general
economic health . . . .” Id. § 8(1). As of the writing of this Article, however, the U.S. Senate has not acted on this
measure. In general, however, although new legislation to protect private property owners from economic
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Detroit,59 the residents of the Poletown neighborhood made national headlines by using
the political process to protest General Motors (GM) and the city of Detroit for seizing
their land for the construction of a Cadillac manufacturing plant. The residents achieved
a temporary victory in delaying the “quick-take” project, but they were ultimately
powerless to stop the takings.60
Therefore, much as members of Congress may relish delegating power to federal
agencies because the agencies “take the heat” for unpopular decisions with the electorate
and these representatives may “look good” before their constituents when opposing those
decisions,61 state legislators may often welcome the delegation of the takings power to
non-profits.

Legislators are ultimately removed from political and electoral

accountability, yet, by virtue of the delegation, may simultaneously and indirectly bestow
benefits onto powerful non-profit corporations in exchange for financial support that
keeps them in office.
Yet another powerful reason that legislatures may delegate the power of eminent
domain is that, as with all delegations, there is nothing in the Constitution and in many
state constitutions that expressly forbids delegation of legislative power to other entities,
private or public, or to other branches of government.62 In effect, there is no Private or
Public Non-Delegation Doctrine written into the Constitution or in many state

development takings is still being introduced the legislative momentum spurred by the Supreme Court's decision
in Kelo seems to have slowed tremendously almost a year after the decision.
59
304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981) (upholding a Michigan quick-take statute that allowed the city of Detroit to take
land in the Poletown neighborhood and to transfer it to General Motors for the construction of a Cadillac auto
plant because the public benefits promised by the plant were substantial).
60
The residents opposed to the project in the Poletown neighborhood formed the Poletown Neighborhood
Council. See Elizabeth F. Gallagher, Note, Breaking New Ground: Using Eminent Domain for Economic
Development, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1837, 1868 (2005). For an excellent history of the Poletown case, see
generally BRYAN D. JONES & LYNN W. BACHELOR, THE SUSTAINING HAND (1986).
61

See THEODORE LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE U.S. 92-3, 298-99 (1969)
(“As Kenneth Davis puts it, Congress in effect says, ‘Here is the problem: deal with it.”) and (“A
delegation of power to the president or to agencies is in reality a delegation of personal responsibility [by
Congress] . . . . ”).
62
See Sunstein, supra note 16, at 322.
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constitutions.63 Indeed, Professor Sunstein notes that, with respect to the Public NonDelegation Doctrine, the Founders did not find troublesome the delegation of power from
Congress to the President for the distribution of military pensions and the granting of
licenses that permitted trade with Native American groups.64

Consequently, a literal

interpretation of the Constitution and the countless state constitutions modeled after it,
along with constitutional and legislative history, would suggest that the delegation of the
takings power to private, non-profit corporations is constitutional.
A final reason to support the notion that the private delegation of power to nonprofits is not problematic is that legislatures in delegating this power should be given
deference in the decisions they make. Most notably, in Berman v. Parker,65 a case in
which the Court upheld the delegation of eminent domain power to the District of
Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency for economic development of a slum-ridden
District neighborhood, the Court stated that “ . . . when the legislature has spoken, the
public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases, the
legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served.”66
The Court went on to note that once the “public purpose had been established,” “the
means of executing the project are for Congress and for Congress alone to determine,”
and the private enterprise could serve the ends of Congress as well as government.67
Not only was the legislative deference espoused in Berman recently reaffirmed by
the Court in Kelo,

68

but also the Kelo Court underscored the “great respect” that it held

63

See Sunstein, supra note 16, at 331 (expressing the belief that the Constitution includes a Non-Delegation
Doctrine, but that there is no “express nondelegation doctrine in the text.”) (emphasis added).
64
See Sunstein, supra note 16, at 322-23 & 331-32.
65
348 U.S. 26 (1954).
66
Id. at 32.
67
Id. at 33-34.
68
Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2664-65.
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for state legislatures’ assessments and determinations of “local needs.”69

With respect

specifically to the delegation of public power to private entities, some commentators have
noted that such a choice can be “reasonable and therefore deserves the judicial respect
given any reasonable legislative policy choice.”70 Finally, in at least one federal circuit,
the Fourth Circuit has indicated that legislative deference in a case involving the use of
eminent domain by the federal government to build a dam should only be disrupted if
there is a case of “arbitrary, capricious, or corrupt conduct.”71

B. Arguments In Support of Restricting Delegation of Eminent Domain Power to
Private, Non-Profit Corporations
The right to seize property is a traditional government power that, like most
similar government powers such as the power to arrest someone, to tax, and to license, is
coercive in nature.72 The sovereign may force an individual to do or not to do something
against his or her will.73 When this coercive power of seizure of property is delegated to
private, non-profits, indeed to any private party, there is undoubtedly created an
opportunity for these parties to seize property for themselves at the expense of the public.
They may also act in their own interests instead of in the public’s interest and to the
general detriment of the public or to an individual.74

This opportunity for “self-

interested”75 action is a result of a classic conflict-of-interest scenario.
69

Id. at 2664. In addition, at the state level, some courts have noted that the legislative branch has the sole
power to “invest” certain entities at its choosing, public or private, with eminent domain power. See, e.g,.
Annbar Associates v. West Side Redevelopment Corp., 397 S.W.2d 635, 647 (Mo. 1965).
70
Lawrence, supra note 5, at 651.
71
U.S. v. 91.69 Acres of Land, More or Less, 334 F.2d 229 (4th Cir. 1964).
72
See supra nn. 6, 25-29.
73
See id.
74
See Lawrence, supra note 5, at 659 (noting that “[t]he concern is that governmental power—power
coercive in nature—will be used to further the private interests of the private actor, as opposed to some
different public interest.”); see also Froomkin, supra note 15, at 153-54 (discussing that “. . . the Carter
Coal doctrine forbidding delegation of public power to private groups, in in fact, rooted in a prohibition
against self-interested regulation . . . .”).
75
Lawrence, supra note 5, at 660.
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The delegation of public power, such as eminent domain, to private parties may
be contrasted with similar delegations to government agencies. However, unlike private
parties, agencies are often headed by appointees of the head of the executive branch and
confirmed by the legislature, or are directly elected in some states.76 In addition, officers
must generally take an oath of office promising that they will uphold the laws of the land,
not their self-interest.77 Furthermore, there is often the weight of the public purse and the
prospect of a cut in funding to a particular agency by the legislature that keeps an agency
accountable, should the agency be mismanaged and act in ways that benefit certain
parties and not the public.78 In contrast, delegating the power to seize property to private
actors chips away at the United States’ democratic form of government by giving an
extraordinary power to private, non-profit corporations that are unaccountable to the
electorate.79
In essence, there is an expectation that a government official with coercive
governmental powers in hand will act in a “disinterested” way and not allow self-interest
to guide his or her decision-making.80 When this expectation is not satisfied in the
public’s opinion, then the electorate “may vote the [public] rascals out.” 81 The public is,
therefore, utilizing the ultimate mechanism of democracy, the voting booth, to rule on the
government’s substantive choices and the way that it chooses to exercise its power.
With private exercise of public power, however, such as the disagreeable exercise
of the takings power delegated to a private, non-profit, no similar mechanism exists to
76

See Reeder, supra note 47, at 218, 226 (discussing the accountability measures on public agencies in
Texas).
77
See id. at 218.
78
See id.
79
See Froomkin, supra note 15, at 159. However, Lawrence notes that the challenge with basing a judicial
decision that involves the delegation of public power to private actors on notions of representative
democracy is that these notions are “supraconstitutional,” and are not found in the specific text of the
Constitution or in state constitutions. They may, therefore, reflect and impose a judge’s value system, as
opposed to the rule of law, on unsuspecting litigants. Lawrence, supra note 5, at 671.
80
Id.
81
Lawrence, supra note 5, at 660.
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deal with these “private rascals.”82 In addition, a similar lack of accountability exists
when this power is delegated with little or no checks on its exercise, such as ultimately
holding an elected official accountable through elections.83 This source of accountability
would likely publicly present another point of view and possibly force a change or the
halt of a private, non-profit’s use of the power. In the eminent domain arena, it is this
lack of accountability that may fuel opportunities for private, non-profits to selfaggrandize.
This reasoning led the U.S. Supreme Court in Carter Coal in 1936 to decry the
private delegation of public power as “most obnoxious.”84 Similarly, it was this same
argument that motivated a concurring opinion by the Texas Supreme Court in Texas Boll
Weevil almost 60 years later,85 in examining whether or not the delegation of the power to
assess fees to the Boll Weevil Foundation was congruent with the Texas Constitution, to
describe it as “[l]ittle more than a posse: volunteers and private entities neither elected
nor appointed, privately organized and supported by the majority of some small group,
backed by law but without guidelines or supervision, wielding great power over people’s
lives and property but answering virtually to no one.”86
Therefore, although the delegation of eminent domain power to private, non-profit
entities with little or no accountability controls may be more time and cost-efficient, as
well as more politically efficient and expedient, more important values, such as
procedural due process,87 are being sacrificed. Equally troublesome is the belief that
concern for deference to the legislature and the lack of explicit language in the
Constitution or in many state constitutions forbidding private delegation of public power
82

Id.
See e.g. infra Parts V.C.1.a. & b and VI.A.
84
See Part II.B., supra nn. 22-23.
85
See supra note 20.
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Texas Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 479 (Hecht, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Lawrence, supra note 5, at 682-83; see also infra Parts IV. A. & B.
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should trump more fundamental concerns related to the prospect of the takings power’s
being exercised by private, non-profit corporations. These non-profits have everything to
gain in their self-interest, but nothing by which to hold them accountable. In addition,
legislators, by virtue of the democratic process in the United States, are not impervious to
the influence of particularly powerful private, non-profit corporations, that like their forprofit cousins, are politically organized and provide electoral and financial support to
legislators who may vote to delegate highly coercive power to them.88
Moreover, the mere threat of a private, non-profit corporation’s having eminent
domain power, regardless of whether or not it actually uses it to seize private property, is
reason enough to argue for restrictions or controls on its use. It is likely that this mere
threat is intimidating, especially to unsophisticated homeowners and small business
owners who are unfamiliar with eminent domain and who may be scared into selling their
real property at below-market prices at the first mention of “eminent domain” by a
powerful private institution.
In addition, even should a private landowner be given a right to a judicial hearing
and/or trial upon a private, non-profit corporation’s assertion of eminent domain power
under an enabling statute, the hiring of attorneys, court costs, and expert witnesses
required for such a process may be entirely too expensive and cumbersome for the
average homeowner and small business owner threatened with eminent domain.
Consequently, any procedural due process rights that may be conferred to a landowner
are effectively foreclosed by the sheer expense of asserting them. Furthermore, even
when the enabling legislation allows for this type of judicial process, often the process
88

See RICHARD POSNER, PROBLEMS WITH JURISPRUDENCE, 354 (1990). (Posner emphasizes that financial
backing is the most necessary tool in winning a campaign), and Ilya Somin, Overcoming Poletown:
County of Wayne v. Hathcock, Economic Development Takings, and the Future of Public Use, MICH. ST. L.
REV. 1005, 1016 (2004). (stating that “[l]ittle prevents municipalities and private interests from abusing the
system. Both corporate interests and political leaders dependent on their support have tremendous
incentives to overestimate the economic benefits of projects furthered by condemnation.”).
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simply involves determining the actual value of the real property seized and addressing
the issue of whether or not the compensation paid by the private, non-profit corporation is
just.89 Therefore, the question of whether or not the delegation of the takings power to a
private, non-profit corporation is even valid or constitutional under Due Process or any
other doctrine is similarly and effectively foreclosed in the courts for many landowners
who lack the resources to undertake a full constitutional determination of the issue.90
Finally, one of the strongest arguments in support of statutory controls on the
delegation of the takings power to private, non-profit corporations is that when
government or a quasi-governmental organization chooses to exercise this power, it is
often, at the very least, after intense public discussion and public hearings that provide for
a significant amount of public input. The effect of these public conversations is often to
compel government to consider alternative points of view that may conceivably force a
re-thinking or the abandonment of its use.91 Should these public discussions not result in
outcomes favorable to the public, then the electorate has the opportunity to hold
government accountable for its decision at election time by choosing to allow officials to
stay in office.92 Consequently, when government and even public agencies are expected
(1) to hold public hearings, (2) are subject to being voted out of office, and (3) are
expected to abide by the minimum federal constitutional requirements of “just
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See, e.g., infra nn. 224-225, Part V.B.3.
See id.
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See, e.g., Rad Sallee, Metro Schedules Three Public Hearings on New Rail Line, HOUS. CHRON., July 14,
2006, at B7 (reporting that Houston, Texas’, public transport authority, or METRO, that has eminent
domain power, has scheduled a series of public hearings regarding its proposed expansion of commuter rail
in neighborhoods and that contemplates the use of eminent domain).
92
See e.g., Wendy Hudley, Allison Says Voters Wanted Change He Credits Opposition to Underpass as
Key to Council Victory, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 16, 2005, at 1S (discussing the ousting of an
incumbent from the Richardson, Texas, City Council, the first in 16 years, who had supported the use of
eminent domain); Clay Barbour, Eminent Domain's Electoral Fallout, Elected Officials Face Widespread
Opposition and Voter Wrath, ST. LOUIS POST, Mar. 31, 2006, at C1; Sofia Kosmetatos, Highland Park
Incumbents Prevail, and Point to Plan for Downtown, June 8, 2005, at 27; Lisa Smith, St. Charles Voters
Hand Mayor's Job to De Witte, Klinkhamer's Eight-year Tenure Ends Following Bitter Campaign, DAILY
HERALD, Apr. 6, 2005, at 1 (noting that now ex-mayor Klinkhamer had approved condemnation of
property for a redevelopment project the year before, without involving the public).
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compensation” and “public use”, and any additional state requirements, it is no more than
logical that private entities empowered with government-like powers to coerce the
seizure of private property should be subject to even more stringent requirements.

C. A Per Se Rule Against the Delegation of Eminent Domain Power to Private, NonProfit and Charitable Corporations?
Given the reasons outlined in Part III.B. of this Article in support of restrictions
on private actor delegates in the takings context, the question arises as to whether or not
there should be a per se rule prohibiting delegations of the takings power to private, nonprofit and charitable corporations. Indeed, this line of reasoning is strengthened, as these
private actors may have significant political and economic power that may bind them
inextricably to elected officials and allow them to influence officials to a large degree.
Despite the persuasive arguments in favor of a per se abolishment of private
delegations of the takings power, this Article takes a more pragmatic approach to them.
As noted in Part V.B. of this Article with respect to the Texas Medical Center case study,
the economic impact of some private, non-profit corporations delegated the takings
power on local communities is immense. This economic impact, whether on an entire
city, as in the Texas Medical Center case study in Houston, or on an entire neighborhood,
as in the Dudley Neighbors, Inc. case study in Boston, is a double-edged sword to local
communities.93 Essentially, in exchange for this economic impact and the significant
“run-off” effects onto the local community, there is an argument that it may be
reasonable to afford these entities the takings power, albeit not without limits, safeguards,
or controls. In addition, there is the further argument that, to a certain extent, local
communities should be able to decide how much of the takings power and by what
strictures they are willing to delegate to a private non-profit.
93

See infra Parts V.A. & B.

24

Allowing room for the delegation of the takings power to these private actors,
however, does not otherwise diminish the argument that there need be suitable statutory
safeguards, controls, or as Professor Froomkin terms it, “accountability mechanisms” 94
that preserve procedural due process. Just as there should be no absolutes with respect to
the prohibition of these delegations, private actors delegated the takings power should not
be absolutely free to seize another individual’s land, unfettered by appropriate and
reasonable statutory safeguards that ensure that the rights of all affected individuals are
respected.95
IV. A Procedural Due Process Approach to the Delegation of Eminent Domain Power to
Private, Non-Profit Corporations
A. Procedural Due Process Generally
The delegation of any public power to private parties, including the delegation of
eminent domain power to private, non-profit corporations almost automatically invokes
procedural due process concerns. First, as a starting point, due process is invoked when
the government, or in the case studies examined in this Article, a private actor, uses its
delegated coercive power to impinge upon an individual’s life, liberty, or property.96
Second, one of the fundamental notions attached to procedural due process is ensuring
that the decision-maker acts in the interest of the public, as opposed to his or her personal
interest or bias, by compelling decisions that are subject to controls and safeguards.97
Indeed, procedural due process has been invoked to prevent “arbitrary decisionmaking” by those with public power, or decision-making that is affected or influenced by
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See supra note 21.
See infra Part VI. regarding recommendations for statutory safeguards.
96
See Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (stating that “[t]he point is
straightforward: the Due Process Clause provides that certain substantive rights-life, liberty, and property
cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures.”).
97
See Lawrence, supra note 5, at 661.
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personal interests rather than what is best for the public.98 Conversely, if, by virtue of a
private delegation of public power, a decision-maker exercises this power against an
individual and is unbound by procedural due process safeguards against arbitrary or selfinterested use of this power, then it may be argued that an individual may have suffered a
deprivation of procedural due process.99

Basic tenets of procedural due process,

therefore, require that decision-making be disinterested. This disinterestedness, in the
eminent domain context, may be ensured by the use of certain procedures, such as
holding elected officials accountable for the takings decisions of private, non-profits.100
B. Justification for the Use of Procedural Due Process Principles in Private Delegations
of the Takings Power
The theory of using due process concepts to assess the private delegation of
public power is not inconceivable or extraordinary. Indeed, one scholar has noted that
state courts that have struck down private delegations, in keeping with Carter Coal, have
honed in on the self-interested nature of such delegations.101 Furthermore, case law
demonstrates that the use of public power to make self-interested decisions on behalf of a
private party is violative of due process.102 In addition, while there is an argument that
98

See Note, supra note 30, at 1408 (stating that “T[p]ublic’ powers may mean powers which the legislature
intended to be exercised for the public welfare, not the delegate’s; there the effect of the rule [against
private delegations of public power] is to require procedures ensuring responsible and impartial decisions.
More often, the rule operates as a limitation on the creation of private powers to be exercised for the
protection of some interest of the delegate.”).
99
See id at 1399 (commenting that “[b]ut whether or not law-making power is deemed delegated, the
legislature’s supreme power remains intact. The significant question therefore is one of due process:
whether legislation which commits these substantial powers to private hands is reasonable.”), and 1408
(noting that “a private group ought not to be given a power to restrict the activities either of its members or
of outsiders where that power may be exercised arbitrarily and without adequate procedural safeguards.
Thus, the rule against delegation may be regarded primarily as an extension of the constitutional principle
of due process.”). The nature of due process suggests that there must be action against “identifiable
individuals.” Lawrence, supra note 5, at 682. The case studies examined in this Article presume that
particularized individuals are affected by takings actions by private, non-profit and charitable corporations.
See infra Parts V.A. and B.
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See Freeman, supra note 3, at 585-86.
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See Suss, 823 F.Supp. at 188 (citing Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973), Commonwealth Coatings
v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968), Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192
(1944), and Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)).
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due process principles are simply inapposite to private delegations on the federal level,
given the federal courts’ long-time reluctance to strike down a private delegation as
unconstitutional, the fact remains that a due process inquiry into private delegations has
not been explicitly foreclosed by the federal courts.

103

The due process inquiry also

remains popular in the state courts.104
In the eminent domain arena, courts have gone so far to state that due process is
even invoked when attempts are made to correct partial and biased uses of governmental
power, such as in the form of paying landowners for compensation for the taking of their
land.105 Furthermore, the notion of placing accountability controls and safeguards on the
private delegation of the takings power is similarly not unheard of. In addition to the
common requirement that a taking be used for a public use or for a public purpose, some
states have taken several steps to mitigate the self-interested use of eminent domain
power by requiring the approval of a state agency for a particular seizure.

106

States

further require an agency to investigate the purpose for which land is seized.107 In
addition, several state courts view private use of the takings power more circumspectly
than public use.108

C. Two Judicial Tests that Assess the Constitutionality of the Private Delegation of
Public Power
1. The Texas Boll Weevil Test
a. Description
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In its 1997 Texas Boll Weevil decision, the Texas Supreme Court struck down the
creation and delegation of power to the private, non-profit Texas Boll Weevil Eradication
Foundation by the Texas legislature as unconstitutional under the Private Non-Delegation
Doctrine.109

The legislature had created the Foundation in order to eradicate the boll

weevil insect, a pest that attacks cotton crops and results in significant economic damage
to cotton producers.110 In the decision, the court outlined a preliminary three-part inquiry
to use in determining the constitutionality of a private delegation.111 This initial threepart test involves: (1) determining whether or not the powers delegated to an entity are
legislative or law-making112 pursuant to separation of powers analysis,113 that dictates
that any power deemed legislative must stay in the legislative branch; (2) assessing
whether or not the delegate is private or public;114 and (3) if the delegation inquiry
survives the previous two parts, analyzing the constitutionality of a delegation under an
additional eight-part test. This eight-part test has been distilled from the scholarly work
of several well-known academics in the non-delegation field, such as Professors Jaffe,
Liebmann, Davis, and Lawrence.115 The Texas Boll Weevil court, however, made it clear
that the eight-part test was strictly for private delegations, 116 noting that it was required
to give “more searching scrutiny” to these delegations.117
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See supra note 20.
See id.
111
See Reeder, supra note 47, at 213 (describing the initial three-part Texas Boll Weevil test).
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Texas Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 465.
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Id.
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See Reeder, supra note 47, at 213; see also Texas Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 470 (“We first address
whether the Foundation is a public or private entity for purposes of the nondelegation doctrine.”).
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Professor Jaffe is the author of the seminal law review article, Law Making by Private Groups, 51
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Parties in American Constitutional Law, 50 IND.L.J. 650 (1975), see supra note 17, and Professor Davis
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Hence, the constitutional analysis in Texas Boll Weevil centers on whether or not
there has been an impermissible delegation of legislative power, power that is supposed
to lie in the legislative branch under both the United States and the Texas
Constitutions.118 Despite the initial three-part inquiry, the heart of the Texas Boll Weevil
analysis is the following eight-part test:

(1)

Are the private delegate’s actions subject to meaningful review by a
state agency or other branch of state government?;

(2)

Are the persons affected by the private delegate’s actions adequately
represented in the decision making process?;

(3)

Is the private delegate’s power limited to making rules, or does the
delegate also apply the law to particular individuals?;

(4)

Does the private delegate have a pecuniary or other personal interest
that may conflict with his or her public function?;

(5)

Is the private delegate empowered to define criminal acts or impose
criminal sanctions?;

(6)

Is the delegation narrow in duration, extent, and subject matter?;

(7)

Does the private delegate possess special qualifications or training
for the task delegated to it?; and

118

Article 1, § 1 of the U.S. Constitution notes that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art 1, § 1. Similarly, Article II, § 1 of the Texas
Constitution states that “[t]he powers of the Government of the State of Texas shall be divided into three
distinct departments, each of which shall be confided to a separate body of magistracy, to wit: Those which
are Legislative to one; those which are Executive to another, and those which are Judicial to another; and
no person, or collection of persons, being of one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly
attached to either of the others, except in the instances herein expressly permitted.” TEX. CONST. art II, §
1. In addition, Article III, § 1 of the Texas Constitution mirrors the legislative vesting language of Article
I, § 1 of the U.S. Constitution by affirming that “[t]he Legislative power of this State shall be vested in a
Senate and House of Representatives, which together shall be styled ‘The Legislature of the State of
Texas.’” TEX. CONST. art III, § 1. For additional explanation of the constitutional foundations of private
and public delegations of power in Texas, see infra note 183.
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(8)

Has the Legislature provided sufficient standards to guide the private
delegate in its work?119

In elucidating this eight-part test, the Texas court further provided several
indications as to how the eight factors should be weighed. For instance, the Texas Boll
Weevil court noted that, in order for a private delegation to be an overly broad delegation
of legislative power under the provision of the Texas constitution that vests lawmaking
power solely in the legislature, a “majority of the factors” must be violated.120

In

addition, the court noted that the legislation at issue, the Texas Boll Weevil Act, was to
be constitutionally reviewed “as a whole.”121

Nonetheless, the court signaled a

cautionary note in its application of the Texas Boll Weevil test, stating that it was to be
applied “sparingly”122 when private delegation was “’running riot.’”123 Moreover, the
court definitively stated that a private delegation did not have to comply with all eight
factors in order to pass constitutional muster under the Texas constitution- it just needed
to satisfy a majority of them.124
b. Subsequent Glosses on the Texas Boll Weevil Test
i. Proctor v. Andrews

125

In 1998, one year after the Texas Supreme Court identified the eight-part Texas
Boll Weevil test, the court further clarified it in Proctor v. Andrews. Proctor called into
question the constitutionality of Texas’ Civil Service Act,126 that provided firefighters
and police officers means to appeal decisions made by their superiors in which they were
119

See Texas Boll Weevil, 952 S.W.2d at 472.
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suspended, passed over for promotion, or demoted. The officer or firefighter could
appeal either to the local civil service commission or to an independent third party.127 If
the officer were to choose the latter route, the city was required to request seven qualified
neutral arbitrators from either the American Arbitration Association (AAA) or the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS).128 Under the statute, a municipality
was required to strike the names of those arbitrators that it would not choose to conduct
the hearings.129 Unless the decision of this arbitrator was unlawful, the decisions were
final, and the officer or firefighter effectively waived his right to appeal the decision to
the district court.130 In Proctor, three cases were consolidated in which the city of
Lubbock had failed to request seven arbitrators or to strike arbitrators pursuant to the
statute.131

Proctor filed suit seeking a declaratory injunction compelling Lubbock’s

compliance, and the city counter-sued contending that the Civil Service Act was
unconstitutional.132
The Proctor court held that the Texas legislature had not acted unconstitutionally
in delegating lawmaking authority to private parties that were private arbitration services
under Texas’s Civil Service Act.133

The court first stated that the case involved a

delegation of power to a private actor,134 and it essentially declined to conduct the private
versus public actor analysis in the second part of the initial three-part inquiry that it
embraced in Texas Boll Weevil.135

127

See Proctor, 972 S.W.2d at 732.
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Secondly, the court explained that when a private actor is the recipient of a
delegation, then the constitutional underpinnings of the Texas Boll Weevil test stem from
Article III, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution that vests legislative power in the
legislative branch.136 In contrast, the Texas Boll Weevil court held that the test sounded
in the separation of powers provisions found in Art. II, Section 1 of the Texas
Constitution.137 Another gloss on the Texas Boll Weevil test that the Proctor court
provided was to state that, even with the eight-part Texas Boll Weevil test, it would
interpret delegations in the most constitutional light possible.138

ii. FM Properties Operating Co. v. City of Austin139
Subsequently, in 2000, the Texas Supreme Court decided FM Properties, a case
in which the city of Austin sought a declaratory injunction against private land owners
who owned more than 500 acres of land, from designating "water quality and protection
zones" within Austin’s extraterritorial jurisdictions.140 The city contended that section
26.179 of the Texas Water Code,141 that allowed landowners to designate certain water
zones as “protected,” was an unconstitutional delegation of power. It also provided the
following five reasons to support its arguments that the pertinent section of the Water
Code was unconstitutional:

1) the provision unconstitutionally delegated legislative

powers to private landowners; 2) it targeted the city of Austin; 3) the statute infringed on
the city's home rule powers conferred by the Texas Constitution; 4) it violated the city's
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Nonetheless, the court also stated that the Texas Boll Weevil test could be applied to delegations of
legislative authority derived from the separations of powers language in Article III, Section 1 of the Texas
constitution. See Proctor, 972 S.W.2d at 735.
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See supra note 113.
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See Proctor, 972 S.W.2d at 735 (“Thus, we consider all eight factors, keeping in mind that if it is
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(citing Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson Co. Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659, 662) (Tex. 1996)).
139
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property rights; and 5) the statute allowed private property owners to suspend the laws.142
The court struck down the delegation of power to private landowners to create water
quality zones as unconstitutional.143
In addition, the court in FM Properties provided further clarification on the
weight of each the eight factors in the Texas Boll Weevil test. For instance, the court
stated that the weight of the factors was to be determined on a case-by-case basis,
according to each individual set of facts.144 Still, it generally noted that when it came to
private delegations of legislative power, two factors in the Texas Boll Weevil test would
be most “heavily” weighted because they address the “central concerns” behind the
delegation of power to private parties: (1) whether or not “the private delegate’s actions
are subject to meaningful review by a state agency or other branch of state government;”
and (2) whether or not the “private actor has a pecuniary or other personal interest that
may conflict with his or her public function.”145
The central concerns referenced by the Texas Supreme Court in FM Properties
are ones that necessarily invoke the procedural due process underpinnings of the PNDD
advocated in this Article. These concerns are the obvious opportunities for self-interested
actions or choices that may guide a private actor that has been delegated public power
and whether or not there are any accompanying accountability mechanisms in the
enabling legislation to make these choices as disinterested as possible.
For instance, one of the “heavily” weighted factors identified by the court in FM
Properties focused on whether or not there is “meaningful government review,” either by
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a state agency or other part of government, of a private delegate’s actions.146 The
requirement of “meaningful government review” goes to one of the most potent and
central ways in a democracy in which private delegates of power may be held
accountable for ostensibly “public” actions - directly or indirectly holding elected
officials responsible for choices made by private delegates.
In addition, the other “heavily” weighted factor in the Texas Boll Weevil test
subsequently emphasized by the Texas Supreme Court in FM Properties assessed the
financial or personal interest that a private actor might have in exercising delegated
authority to it. This factor, therefore, allowed the court to concentrate on the inherently
self-interested opportunities that arise for private delegates of public power.
Finally, in FM Properties, the Texas court further refined the definition of
legislative power, at issue in the initial three-part Texas Boll Weevil inquiry.147 The court
stated in FM Properties that legislative power is generally the power “to make rules and
determine public policy,” while including “many administrative aspects, including the
power to provide the details of the law, to promulgate rules and regulations to apply the
law, and to ascertain conditions upon which existing laws may operate.”148

c. The Texas Boll Weevil Test Under Scrutiny

The eight-part Texas Boll Weevil test has been criticized by some commentators
as too vague and subjective.149 Indeed, although the Texas Supreme Court stated that a
private delegation must pass muster under a majority of the eight factors to be
146

See supra Part IV.D.1.a. note 119.
See supra note 112.
148
FM Properties, 22 S.W.3d at 873.
149
See Reeder, supra note 47, at 222-23 (asserting that the test gives little “guidance” to lower courts,
legislators, and private parties because of its “vagueness” and that it “simply describes a subjective
analysis.”).
147

34

nonviolative of the state constitution, it is unclear exactly how many factors constitute a
majority. It is also unclear how much each factor should be weighted. For example, the
delegation analysis by the court in Texas Boll Weevil resulted in the delegation’s “failing”
five of the factors, “passing” one factor, and being “inconclusive” or neutral in two
others.150 In contrast, in Proctor, the delegation “passed” all factors, except for one.151
Highlighting the subjective nature of the eight-part case-by-case inquiry, the Texas
Supreme Court in Proctor disagreed with the state court of appeals’ weighing of,
whether or not “the Legislature had provided sufficient standards to guide the private
delegate in its work, as against the delegation.”152
Similarly, in FM Properties, in which the Texas Supreme Court stated that it
would weigh whether or not there was “meaningful government review” and the private
delegate’s interests more “heavily” than other factors, the court in a numerical breakdown
determined that four factors of the eight-part Texas Boll Weevil test weighed against the
delegation.153 Two of these factors weighed “heavily” against the constitutionality of the
delegation.154 On the other hand, the court noted that the delegation passed muster under
two of the factors and was neutral with respect to others. Thus, the numerical breakdown
that permitted the court to strike down the private delegation in FM Properties, was four
against (two heavily), two in favor, and two neutral.155
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Indeed, with the wide mix of numerical scenarios that has resulted in the
application of the Texas Boll Weevil test in only three cases involving private delegation
of power, there are conceivably a limitless number of numerical possibilities and
weighted outcomes, yielding a wide band of subjectivity and making the test “susceptible
to nuance.”156 Questions, therefore, abound. As one commentator has noted:

What would be the “right” mix of factors and heavily weighted factors
that would warrant upholding a private delegation? What if the enactment
narrowly fails five factors, but passes the other three by a wide margin?
Could a particular act fail a particular factor in such an appalling and
offensive way that it requires invalidating the delegation, even if it passes
all other factors? Should the courts simply count all factors as equal, or
perform a weighted average balancing test? How should courts account
for neutral factors?157
Nonetheless, while it is true that it the application of the Texas Boll Weevil test has not
yet resulted in clear numerical formulas and weights for each of the eight factors, the
Texas Supreme Court has, at each application of the test, increasingly approached this
point.
For example, after applying the test only three times, the court surmised in FM
Properties that of all eight factors, those touching upon meaningful government review
and the financial or personal interest of the private delegate are most important.
Furthermore, the same questions raised with respect to the lack of a clear mathematical
formula for determining whether a private delegation is unconstitutional, from a federal
or state perspective, are common to many case-by-case, multi-step judicial tests. The
nature of the law is such that it is difficult to provide precise mathematical formulas,
given the fungible nature of facts and the myriad ways in which enabling statutes
authorizing private delegations may be made.
156
157

Id. at 223.
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Moreover, the Texas Boll Weevil test, while not perfect, is one of the few
comprehensive tests that examine the constitutionality of the private delegations of public
power. The test is, therefore, a good starting point by which to analyze this issue, given
that it addresses, from a procedural due process perspective, the core concern of
procedural due process, to balance and to check the self-interested use of coercive power
by verifiable and appropriate accountability mechanisms.

d. Proposed Modifications of the Texas Boll Weevil Test that Address Procedural
Due Process Concerns of Private Delegations in the Eminent Domain Context
i. The Eight-Part Core Test
The Texas Boll Weevil test is a good analytical starting point because it is one of
the few comprehensive tests to examine the constitutionality of private delegations, and it
addresses and distills many of the long-time concerns with these delegations that have
been discussed by commentators. There is, nonetheless, room for improvement of the
test in the eminent domain context.
For example, at least with regard to the procedural due process concerns
expressed in this Article, such as the importance of ensuring disinterested application of a
private delegation of public power through appropriate accountability controls, it appears
that the factors embodying (1) meaningful government oversight of the delegation, (2)
whether or not individuals affected by a private delegate’s action have an opportunity to
be heard, (3) the self-interest of the exercised action by the private delegate and how this
interest affects the delegate’s public function, and (4) whether or not there are any
existing limitations on the private delegate’s power, squarely confront the issues raised
by procedural due process in the takings context in this Article.158 Thus, from the
158
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perspective of a private delegation of eminent domain power, especially as practically
illustrated in the case studies of Dudley Neighborhood Initiative, Inc. and Texas Medical
Center in Parts V.A. and B. of this Article, these four factors would appear to be most
relevant.
However, it may be argued that the qualification on one “heavily” weighted
factor of the Texas Boll Weevil test, concerning a private actor’s pecuniary or personal
interest, should be amended. As is evidenced by the two case studies,159 instead of
qualifying the private delegate’s interest in terms of one “that may conflict with his or her
[the private actor’s] public function,”160 the qualification should be couched in terms that
relate to a landowner’s or to a resident’s interest.
On the other hand, while these four procedurally due process-influenced factors
may address the two particular delegates and the enabling statutes in the case studies in
this Article, future statutes may conceivably arise that permit a private actor the right to
define criminal sanctions if a landowner were to resist the taking of his or her property,
another of the Texas Boll Weevil factors.161

Therefore, although (1) meaningful

government oversight of the delegation, (2) an opportunity to be heard by affected
individuals, (3) an examination of the interests of the private delegate, and (4) an analysis
of any existing limitations on the private delegate’s power address the current central
concerns of the procedural due process aspects of existing delegations of eminent domain
power to private parties, they may not in future delegations of such power. Thus, for this
reason alone, the Texas Boll Weevil test is useful because of its comprehensive nature in
addressing a wide range of issues that may arise through private delegations of any sort
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of traditional governmental and coercive power, but especially in the eminent domain
context.
ii. The Initial Three-Part Inquiry
In addition, apart from the eight-factor core of the test, the initial three-part
inquiry of the Texas Boll Weevil test seems to be unduly laden with particularly unwieldy
issues when applying it to the private delegation of the takings power. For instance, the
first part of the initial three-part inquiry centers on the issue of whether or not there has
been legislative or law-making power delegated to a private actor.162 This analysis has
required, in some instances, substantial feats by the Texas Supreme Court to conform a
particular delegation with nebulous definitions of legislative or law-making power to
those that impact public policy or engage in rulemaking.163
A less unwieldy inquiry, especially in the eminent domain arena, may, however,
be one that centers on determining whether or not a power is traditionally public,
governmental, and therefore coercive. A coercive power is one that has traditionally been
exercised by government.164 Delegation of eminent domain power to a private actor
would, therefore, clearly fit within the confines of this definition.
Moreover, the second part of the initial three-step test in recent Texas practice has
often been a needlessly drawn-out examination determining whether or not an actor is
public or private.165 For instance, in FM Properties and in Proctor, the Texas Supreme
Court was clear from the outset that delegation to a private actor was at issue. In Proctor,
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power had been delegated to arbitrators that were unaffiliated with state government.166
In FM Properties, the delegation had been made to private landowners.167
In Texas Boll Weevil, however, the court appeared to undergo a tortured processof-elimination analysis in determining whether or not the Official Cotton Growers’ Boll
Weevil Eradication Foundation was a private or a public entity.168 On the one hand, the
Texas Commissioner of Agriculture had to certify the Foundation, making the
Foundation appear to be a public actor. Yet, on the other hand, the court cited the
following factors to determine that the Foundation was a private actor:

(1)

The

Foundation was ultimately a private, non-profit organization that had resulted from the
petitioning of the Commissioner of Agriculture by Texas Cotton Producers, Inc., another
non-profit that represented growers of cotton,169 (2) the Foundation’s board members did
not have to take public oaths of office, (3) the funds collected by the Foundation were
statutorily outside the scope of state funds, and (4) the funds were not subject to
governmental procurement and audit requirements.170 While theoretically there may be
instances in which it may be unclear if a particular entity delegated this power is a private
or a public agency, this part of the initial three-part Texas Boll Weevil inquiry in the
eminent domain context may be unnecessary, given the limited amount of potentially
private actors that fall outside the traditional delegates of eminent domain powerrailroads, public utilities, and private actors of the same ilk.

2. Scrutinizing and Modifying the Lawrence Test
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In addition to the Texas Boll Weevil test, Professor Lawrence describes a very
general two-step judicial analysis that may be applied to private delegations of public
power and that also squarely confronts the procedural due process concerns inherent in
these delegations. The first part of the test essentially asks courts to weigh the interest
differentials between the public and the private delegate.171 The interests of the public, or
at least in the eminent domain context, the interests of affected landowners and the
private actor, will likely exist on a continuum: those in which they are in full conflict,
those in which there is no conflict, and those that may fall between these two opposing
poles.172
The outcome of the second part of Lawrence’s two-part judicial inquiry is then
determined by the level of conflicting interest ascertained in the first part of his test. The
second part of Lawrence’s test, however, involves a court’s examining whether or not
there are sufficient statutory procedural safeguards, controls, or mechanisms on a
particular delegation to a private party.173 For instance, the more conflict of interest there
is between a private delegate and affected landowners in a takings scenario, the more
procedural safeguards Lawrence’s test says there should be. Similarly, a lesser interest
differential would merit fewer procedural controls on the private actor’s power in the
enabling delegation statute.174 If there is no conflict of interest, then presumably there
need be no accountability mechanisms included in the enabling legislation of the
delegation.
The Lawrence test, like the Texas Boll Weevil test, is not one that would permit a
quick, easy, and determinative analysis of all potential private delegations. This test
necessarily implies the courts’ having to make case-by-case inquiries, and perhaps
171
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adjusting the rules and standards and applications over time, thus resulting in a less
objective test than may be desired.
In addition, by hitting at the heart of the procedural due process
underpinnings of the Private Non-Delegation Doctrine, that private delegates of public
power act in a disinterested way that is ensured by statutory accountability mechanisms,
Lawrence’s suggested two-part inquiry is obviously less unwieldy than its eight-part
Texas Boll Weevil counterpart. However, this greater facial efficiency may result in even
more subjective and unwieldy analyses by courts, given that the latter test forces a court
to consider any number of potential factors that may arise in a private delegation and to
answer them forthrightly with an affirmative, negative, or neutral response. For instance,
in the Texas Boll Weevil test, the factors centering on whether affected persons are
represented in a private actor’s decision to use delegated power and the pecuniary or
personal interest of a private actor, arguably address the self-interested opportunity of a
private delegation of public power. Moreover, the portions of the Texas Boll Weevil test
examining meaningful government review and how narrow the delegation is in “duration,
extent, and subject matter”175 primarily confront the other main concerns of procedural
due process: accountability mechanisms and controls. Tangentially, other factors of the
test, including whether or not a private delegate may define criminal acts and whether the
legislature has provided adequate standards to guide the delegate, also confront this main
concern of procedural due process.176
Furthermore, while addressing the core of procedural due process, the first part of
the Lawrence test may result in an even more subjective inquiry than the Texas Boll
Weevil inquiry. There are simply no guidelines or guiding questions, unlike in the Texas
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test, that force courts to focus on the nature of the interests (both public and private) and
the nature and extent of any conflicts between the private actor’s interest and the affected
landowner in an eminent domain context. Nonetheless, it is difficult to develop a more
precise, perhaps more objective test, given the innumerable sets of facts that could arise
and the varied ways in which legislation that enables delegation could be written.
Finally, this Article does not agree with the more flexible approach of the
second part of the Lawrence inquiry. This second part matches the safeguards or controls
to the conflict in interests between a private delegate and affected communities. As a
general rule, this paper asserts that there should be a maximum number of accountability
mechanisms included in enabling legislation of private delegations of eminent domain
power because of the severely coercive nature of a seizure of an individual’s land, be it a
home, investment property, or small business.

What precisely this “number” of

mechanisms is, is again determined on a case-by-case, necessarily subjective inquiry.

D. An Alternative Approach: Substantive Due Process
An alternative approach that may be considered when assessing the question of
whether or not the takings power should be delegated to private, non-profit corporations
is substantive due process. Having considered these arguments, this Article ultimately
finds them more unsatisfactory than those involving procedural due process in affording
protections to those impacted by the decisions of private, non-profit corporations that use
delegated eminent domain power. It has been a settled question of law that property
rights are classified as economic due process rights, and they are accordingly examined
under a less-stringent two-pronged test that involves answering the following inquiry: 1)
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whether or not there is a legitimate end to the takings power delegation; and 2) whether
the end is rationally related to the means sought by which to achieve it.177
Under this standard of analysis, there is little doubt that almost any private
delegation of the takings power to a private, non-profit corporation would serve a
legitimate end, given that a state legislature would not delegate such massive power to an
entity that did not add great value, usually economic, to the state or to its subdivisions.178
Enhancing or preserving a state’s economic base is certainly a legitimate end. Secondly,
there is an argument that this end is rationally related to the delegation by the state to the
non-profit because it preserves economic and political efficiencies to the non-profit, as
well as to the government, allowing the non-profit ostensibly to continue to add value to a
state’s economy.

Indeed, as a practical matter, the rational basis test under which

economic regulations are examined is one under which most private delegations should
pass muster. As Professor Lawrence notes, “almost any delegation will be found to be a
sensible means of reaching legitimate goals.”179 When faced with the rational-basis test,
many courts will do almost whatever it takes to keep from striking down an economic
regulation promulgated by the legislature.180
On the other hand, a court might not uphold a private delegation of the takings
power to a non-profit corporation if the rationale for the delegation no longer fit the
times.181 This question may be important to consider in assessing the following case
studies, especially that involving the Texas Medical Center. This delegation was made
over fifty years ago, and it has never been litigated.182 Notwithstanding this concern,
177
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however, a substantive due process approach, with its lessened scrutiny of a private
delegation of the takings power, would simply ignore the more fundamental and
significant procedural due process inquiry discussed in Parts IV. A. and B. of this Article
that, at the very least, allows for a more balanced, nuanced approach to all parties
affected by a private non-profit’s decision to exercise the takings power delegated to it.183

V. An Introduction to Two Case Studies in which Eminent Domain Power Has Been
Delegated to Private, Non-Profit Corporations
The two case studies discussed in this section of this Article are actual examples
of instances in which the very public power of eminent domain has been delegated to a
private non-profit or charitable corporation. Each case study occupies a place on the
polar extremes of the procedural due process spectrum.

A. Case Study One: Dudley Neighbors, Inc./Dudley Neighborhood Street Initiative
1. History
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Dudley Neighbors, Inc. (DNI), is the eminent domain arm of the Dudley Street
Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI), a Boston, Massachusetts, community group with the
mission of revitalizing the long-neglected Dudley neighborhood in the Roxbury/North
Dorchester section of Boston.184 When DSNI was formed in 1984, there were 1,300
trash-filled empty property lots in the Dudley neighborhood.185 In particular, DNI is a
non-profit urban community land trust. 186 Its charge has been to use the takings power
to assemble disparate parcels of primarily vacant land in the Dudley Triangle section of
the neighborhood to construct affordable housing.187 For instance, in the early 1990’s,
DNI used eminent domain on 132 vacant parcels of land that were eventually used to
build 134 affordable-housing units for residents of the neighborhood.188 Subsequently,
DNI’s eminent domain power has been used to seize land for additional homes, a
greenhouse for Dudley residents, gardens, and parks.189

2. Mechanics of Statutory Due Process Accountability Controls
The relevant Massachusetts enabling statute allows an urban redevelopment
corporation, including a charitable corporation, to take land by eminent domain, provided
that certain extensive procedures, ostensibly designed to foment accountability in the
takings process, are followed.190

Massachusetts courts view urban redevelopment

corporations, although some may be technically classified as for-profit corporations, as
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more akin to public service or charitable corporations because they are designed to
benefit the public.191
The first step is that the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) must delegate to
the DNI the power of eminent domain, a power that has already been delegated to
BRA.192 Second, DNI, or any other urban redevelopment corporation formed pursuant to
the statute, must be engaged in revitalizing blighted areas of certain communities in
Massachusetts.193 Third, before DNI may undertake a project, even before the exercise of
eminent domain power is contemplated, it must receive approval from both the planning
board and the city council of the city of Boston, following a public hearing on the
issue.194 Notice for the public hearing must be published on at least two occasions, no
earlier than 14 days before the date of a hearing, in a newspaper of general circulation
and posted in a conspicuous place in Boston.195 The enabling statute then requires that a
second form of mailed notice be given to all landowners who are within or abut a
proposed project.196
In addition, the planning board submits a report, within 45 days of the public
hearing, that includes an analysis of details such as whether or not the area is blighted and
how the proposed redevelopment comports with the city’s master plan.

197

The report

must also include a recommendation to approve or to disapprove a project to the city
council.198

The city council, in turn, is then charged with submitting a report that

approves or disapproves a project to the mayor, within 90 days of the public hearing and
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within 45 days of the council’s receipt of the planning board’s report.199 Furthermore,
both reports must be written and made available to the public, including copies sent by
certified mail to those individuals who were notified of the public hearing.200 Moreover,
any person “aggrieved by the approval or disapproval of a project” has 60 days within the
time that the city council has transmitted its report to the mayor to seek recourse in the
courts.201
Another check on the use of eminent domain power by DNI or other urban
redevelopment corporations in Massachusetts is that a project must provide a means, for
persons or families who are displaced by the exercise of the power, to be provided in the
site or in an equivalent area the following three items: (1) a place to live that is similar
in rent to the displaced dwelling, (2)

is “reasonably accessible” to their places of

employment, and (3) is safe, decent, and accessible to public utilities, shopping, and
public transportation.202 A project may not be approved by the planning board or city
council if contingency plans for displaced families and individuals through the use of
eminent domain are not included.203
A final check on the exercise of the takings power by DNI is that once a project is
approved by the planning board and city council, a certificate is issued to BRA. BRA
then makes a third, separate and final determination of a project’s approval.204

3. Due Process Accountability Controls in DNI’s and DSNI’s Organizational Structure
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In addition to the significant statutory due process mechanisms in the enabling
statute of the DNI, there are a number of other accountability controls in the
organizational structure of DNI and of its parent organization, DSNI, that serve to
preserve disinterested aims of procedural due process. For instance, DNI is governed by
an 11-member board of directors, six of whom are appointed by DSNI and one each
appointed by the mayor of Boston, the Roxbury Neighborhood Council, the city council
member for the district, and the state senator and state house representative for the
neighborhood.205 DSNI, the parent organization of DNI, is in turn governed by a 29-seat
board of directors, 14 of whom are residents (both adults and youth) of the Dudley
neighborhood, with the remaining board members representing seven other non-profit
agencies, two community churches, two neighborhood businesses, and two community
development organizations.206 Except for two seats on DSNI’s board of directors, all
directors are elected by Dudley neighborhood residents.207

4. Preliminary Analysis of Procedural Due Process Statutory and Organizational Controls
The main concern expressed in this Article with respect to the private delegation
of the very public eminent domain power to non-profit and charitable corporations is that
these entities will exercise the takings power in a self-interested manner to the detriment
and to the exclusion of the public interest. Opportunities for this manner of exercise are
ripe for non-profits delegated the takings paper in enabling statutes that do not contain
certain controls, such as the electoral accountability that exists with respect to the public
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exercise of eminent domain power.208 As applied to DNI, however, this concern is
significantly downplayed by the wide-ranging accountability mechanisms inherent in the
enabling statute and in the organizational structures of DNI and DSNI.
For instance, in the enabling statute for Massachusetts urban redevelopment
corporations, there is accountability to elected officials for an exercise of eminent domain
at almost every level of local government.

Indeed, approval for a project must be

received by the planning board, the city council, and BRA, all public or quasi-public
entities, that are either directly or indirectly accountable to voters. Moreover, even
though a project does not necessarily require the approval of the mayor, he or she
receives the city council’s recommendation for a particular project. Therefore, Boston’s
mayor may ostensibly intervene politically should a particular taking and redevelopment
project prove sensitive.
Furthermore, the statutory process calls for a number of opportunities for the
public interest to be heard, given that the law requires that there be a joint public hearing
between the city council and planning boards and that affected property owners be given
at least three kinds of notice for the hearing. Also, the process includes an appeal that
aggrieved property owners may use to have their say in the courts. Most importantly,
when it comes to the use of eminent domain power by DNI or similar urban
redevelopment corporations, the process requires that redevelopment projects may not be
approved by the planning board if there are no relocation plans for affected residents or
landowners.
These numerous statutory accountability processes in the exercise of eminent
domain power by DNI serve as checks on the self-interested use of the takings power,
and they may be juxtaposed to similar accountability mechanisms in the organizational
208
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structure of DNI and DSNI. For instance, five of DNI’s board of directors are selected by
elected representatives at all levels of state and local government.

Should these

representatives approve a taking that is contrary to the Dudley community’s will, then
presumably the elected officials responsible for their selection may be held accountable
on Election day. Furthermore, the remaining six directors of DNI are selected by DSNI,
of which 27 of its directors are selected by the residents of the Dudley neighborhood and
of which 14 must be residents of the community.
These six directors of DNI are therefore held at least indirectly accountable for
their vote to use eminent domain power by the ostensibly affected residents of its
exercise. Organizational controls call for the Dudley community to be in ultimate control
of the use of eminent domain power by DNI, checks that are in great contrast to the selfinterested use of power that is ripe for abuse in the Texas Medical Center case study.209
Yet another foundational and historical check on the use of eminent domain
power by DNI is that its parent organization, DSNI, was borne out of efforts by the
community, in partnership with a local foundation, to improve the neighborhood.210
Thus, to the extent that DNI uses its privately delegated takings power, the communityfocused roots of DNSI inform DNI’s actions by essentially forcing it to use its power in
ways with which the community will agree. Even though DNI’s actions may be deemed
self-interested because they benefit the community, they are wholly disinterested because
one particular person or private party is not benefiting - it is likely the entire Dudley
neighborhood.

B. Case Study Two: The Texas Medical Center (TMC)
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1. History
The second case study that this Article will examine is that of the Texas Medical
Center (TMC) in Houston, Texas. TMC is a non-profit charitable corporation211 that
oversees the largest medical complex in the world,212 spans more than 1,000 acres of land
in the heart of Houston,213 to which over 13 hospitals, two medical schools, four nursing
schools, with additional schools of dentistry, public health, and pharmacy belong.214
Although TMC does not itself provide patient care or employ any medical personnel, it
owns and manages much of the real property and provides maintenance and ancillary
services, including upkeep of roads, landscaping, and constructing of parking facilities,
for its 42 member institutions.215

In addition, the member institutions brought

approximately $3.5 billion in medical research funding to Houston between the years
2000 and 2004, employed over 63,000 workers in 2004, and had 5.2 million patient visits
in 2004 alone.216
TMC was granted the power of eminent domain in 1959.217 It has used its takings
power on at least one occasion in 2004 to condemn a residential house in an adjacent
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neighborhood as part of a plan to construct a five-story, approximately 500-space parking
garage on land previously occupied by houses in a residential neighborhood.218
2. Mechanics of Statutory and Organizational Due Process Controls
In comparison to the statutory due process controls and accountability
mechanisms of the previous case study, DNI, TMC has very little restrictions or
accountability mechanisms on its takings power. Indeed, sections two and four of the
Texas enabling statute allow TMC “full authority and [eminent domain] power” “for the
purpose of acquiring lands adjacent to or contiguous (whether or not separated by public
thoroughfares)” to it for the construction, maintenance, and operation of “facilities
dedicated to medical care, teaching, and research for the public welfare, including
ancillary or service activities generally and customarily recognized as essential to such
facilities in a medical center.”219 In addition, sections three and four of the statute permit
TMC to use its taking power to transfer title or to lease property acquired through
eminent domain to any “nonprofit corporation, association, foundation, or trust” for 99
years with a renewal option.220
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There do, however, appear to be three statutory restrictions on TMC’s takings
power. First, section five of the law notes that should TMC acquire property through
eminent domain and choose not to use the acquired land “for the purpose of medical care,
teaching, or research or essential ancillary and service activities,” then title to the seized
property will revert to the original owner or to his or her “heirs, devisees, or assigns.”221
Second, section six of the enabling statute, a recent amendment to it, requires that before
TMC begins the takings process or records title to acquired real property, it must provide
“written notice by certified mail” to each recorded landowner of property for each parcel
of land that it “seeks to acquire or purchase; or that is not more than 200 feet from any
boundary of any unit of real property.” 222 The intended use of the property, whether it is
seized through eminent domain or purchased outright, must not comport with deed
restrictions.223 Third, the statute mandates that should TMC exercise its takings power,
then a condemnation hearing must be held in which three special county commissioners
award damages and costs to an aggrieved landowner for his or her property.224 However,
once TMC pays the damages and costs to a landowner, deposits this money with the
court, and executes a bond, then it may take possession of the seized property.225
With respect to the issue of accountability restrictions in TMC’s organizational
structure, in contrast to DNI and DSNI, there is no direct or indirect accountability to the
electorate or populations affected by a taking of land. Indeed, TMC is a privately-run
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non-profit organization with a privately-appointed board of directors that remains largely
anonymous to the public and to the electorate.226
3. Preliminary Analysis of Procedural Due Process Accountability Mechanisms
The statutory restrictions on TMC’s eminent domain power are minimal at best,
especially in comparison to those of the first case study, DNI. In addition, the controls
resist a due process appellation. For instance, the reversion interest to the original
landowner that is mandated if TMC does not use land seized by eminent domain for
medical care, teaching, research, or ancillary or service purposes,227 comprehends little of
the “disinterested” concerns inherent in procedural due process. The reversion of land
occurs only after 1) the taking has taken place and 2) the passage of time has elapsed to
indicate that TMC will not use the acquired land in accordance with the statutorily
mandated restriction on its use. Therefore, TMC may still fundamentally exercise the
public power of eminent domain in a self-interested way, until it chooses not to use the
property for a particular purpose. Nonetheless, this statutorily mandated purpose may in
itself be deemed self-defeating, given that there is no time restriction included in the
statute as to when reversion may take place, once TMC has failed to comply with the
purpose of the seized land.
Does reversion take place after 30 days, months, years, etc.? Therefore, what
accountability mechanisms may have been contemplated in the statute with respect to
reversion are negated by the lack of a time requirement regarding when a purpose is
unfulfilled and when reversion must occur.
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Moreover, the notice requirements in the statute that become effective once TMC
decides to pursue condemnation or even to purchase real property for an intended use that
does not accord with private deed restrictions,228 are helpful in that they alert surrounding
landowners, as well as the owner of targeted property, to potentially incompatible uses of
real property. The notice requirements may also help neighborhoods and individuals to
mount and to mobilize a potential political solution to the use of eminent domain or the
purchase of real property by TMC. While this recent amendment to the TMC enabling
statute may be considered welcome relief to landowners in an area targeted for exercise
of eminent domain power, the fact remains that while TMC may give notice, it may also
ultimately exercise its delegated right to eminent domain, regardless of the interests of a
neighboring community. Thus, this notice restriction does not address the underlying
procedural due process concern of disinterested action found in TMC’s private exercise
of eminent domain power.
In addition, the third statutory restriction on TMC’s use of the takings power,
regarding the mandate that a condemnation hearing be held and three commissioners be
appointed to assess the value of the land taken by TMC,229 is similarly unavailing. At the
point that a condemnation hearing is held, the only purpose of the proceeding and
appointment of the commissioners is to determine the compensation that should be
awarded a landowner whose property has been seized.230

This hearing does not

contemplate the constitutional question of whether or not TMC, as a private actor, should
have been delegated the extremely public power of eminent domain, without more
forceful accountability and due process mechanisms.231
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Further, the TMC enabling statute includes two instances in which general
procedural due process concerns such as the disinterested exercise of the takings power
are effectively circumscribed. For instance, the statute authorizes that TMC may exercise
eminent domain power for ancillary or service purposes related to medical care, teaching,
and/or research.232 However, the statute does not include any statutory limitations or
definitions of what constitutes an ancillary or service purpose that would merit the use of
eminent domain.

Therefore, because these terms remain undefined, arguably any

arbitrary or self-interested purpose on the part of TMC could be used to justify the
organization’s exercise of eminent domain. These arbitrary or self-interested purposes
could ostensibly include parking or recreational facilities in a particular area in which
TMC was able to acquire real property at relatively low market rates, such as what
happened in the TMC’s most recent exercise of eminent domain.233 These acquisitions
are in comparison to alternative sites with potentially higher costs but lower indices of
social and public disruption.
Moreover, the enabling statute arguably allows TMC to be a virtual property PacMan, gobbling up land, via the takings power, that is ever contiguous or adjacent to its
previously acquired property.234 Therefore, as the non-profit attains property, either
through outright purchase of land through negotiations with a landowner or through use
of the coercive power of eminent domain, real estate next to this property is then at risk
or is under statutory threat of being seized. The effect of this statutory permissiveness is
to provide TMC with almost blank-check authority to exercise or to threaten to exercise
eminent domain powers on land that is located near any of its property, regardless of the
location of the land, how it is currently being used, and future plans for its use by TMC.
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Finally, even if TMC does not use its power of eminent domain delegated to it by
the Texas legislature, by virtue of its having the power under the enabling statute, private
property covenants restricting the use of the land, or deed restrictions, acquired by TMC
are effectively extinguished.235 The effect of this statutory permissiveness, therefore,
appears to be just the sort that potentially provides a breeding ground for opportunities by
private non-profit actors to use the mere threat of eminent domain authority in selfinterested ways and that ignores the interests of the larger public and community.

C. Application of the Modified Texas Boll Weevil and Lawrence Tests to DNI and TMC
1. DNI
a. Application of the Texas Boll Weevil Test to DNI
Under the modified Texas Boll Weevil test, DNI, the Boston-based, private, nonprofit corporation delegated the power of eminent domain that was introduced in Part V.
A. of this Article, would pass with flying colors. For instance, the analysis under the
modified Texas test for private delegations of eminent domain power proposed in this
Article begins with an initial two-part inquiry as to (1) whether or not traditionally
governmental, coercive powers, i.e. public powers, have been delegated, and (2) whether
or not these public powers have been delegated to a private entity that rests outside the
traditional constitutional categories of private entities delegated the power of eminent
domain, such as railroads companies and public utilities. As applied here, by virtue of its
being delegated the power of eminent domain, a traditionally governmental power that is
235
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coercive because it can force a landowner to relinquish her real property irrespective of
her wishes, DNI has accordingly been delegated a public power. Secondly, DNI is not a
railroad, public utility, or other company that would fall within the traditional permissible
private eminent domain categories - it is a private, non-profit company, albeit with a
sizeable community influence over it.
The next step in the application of the modified eight-part Texas Boll Weevil test
to DNI is an analysis pursuant to the following factors:236 (1) whether or not there is
meaningful government review of a private delegate’s actions by “a state agency or other
branch of state government,” (2) whether or not individuals who are affected by the
delegate’s actions have adequate representation in the delegate’s “decision making
process,” (3) assessing the private delegate’s economic and/or personal interest, and (4)
analyzing whether or not the delegation is “narrow in duration, extent, and subject
matter.”237
With respect to the issue of whether or not there is meaningful government review
as applied to DNI, it is apparent that this factor weighs in favor of the delegation of the
takings power to DNI. The Massachusetts enabling statute allows for at least five levels
of government review by a state agency or other branch of state government.238

For

instance, both the city council and the planning board must approve a project of DNI,
encompassing two levels of review by state government.239 BRA, the delegating entity of
eminent domain power to DNI, must then perform a tertiary review of the project and
then approve or disapprove it.240 Fourth, with respect to the specific use of eminent
236
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domain power by DNI, the Massachusetts enabling statute requires that unless reasonable
contingency plans are made by DNI for any residents displaced by eminent domain, then
the city council and the planning board may not approve the redevelopment project.241
Finally, a fifth level of direct government review is that anyone, within 60 days of the
city council’s having approved or disapproved a project in its report to the mayor, has the
statutory right to seek review by the state courts.242
Not only, however, does the enabling legislation for DNI and similarly situated
community development corporations in Massachusetts allow for multiple levels of
government review by a number of branches and offices of government, but also the
particular organizational structure of DNI’s board of directors serves as an indirect source
of government review on the takings plans of DNI. For instance, four out of the eleven
board members of DNI are selected by the mayor, city council representative, state house
representative, and state senate representative for the Dudley neighborhood.243 Hence, if
a particular taking proves controversial, then the members of DNI’s board appointed by
elected officials, presumably before approving a project, would likely vote in a manner
not inconsistent with electoral forces, allowing these officials to stay in elected office.
Therefore, the five levels of direct government review by varied branches and offices, in
addition to the indirect government review by a number of different elected offices,
ensure that the meaningful government review portion of the modified Texas Boll Weevil
test is satisfied.
Moreover, with respect to the issue of whether or not affected persons by a private
delegate’s actions are adequately represented in the delegate’s decision-making process,
it appears that this inquiry similarly satisfies notions of procedural due process in four
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ways. Three of these ways are direct, and one is indirect. First, the enabling state statute
requires that two types of notice be sent to any landowner whose land is adjacent to a
project not more than 14 days in advance of the joint public hearing of the city council
and planning board.244 Second, the landowners have an opportunity, in advance of a
project’s approval by the city council and the planning board, to voice their concerns and
to be heard before the decision-makers. Third, the fact that contingency plans must be
erected for any resident affected by a project that involves the taking of land, necessarily
implies that affected residents have a say in a project that involves eminent domain, if
only to communicate how they might be impacted.245 Fourth, an indirect way in which
affected persons are represented in DNI’s decision-making process is that Dudley
neighborhood residents, whether or not landowners, essentially elect six out of DNI’s
eleven directors.246 Neighborhood residents elect the vast majority of the directors of
DNCI, which then chooses six of DNI’s board members.247

Therefore, because affected

landowners and residents of any takings power that DNI may exercise have four levels of
representation, this element of the modified Texas Boll Weevil test also weighs in favor of
the delegation of the takings power to DNI.
With respect to the part of the modified Texas Boll Weevil test that addresses the
private delegate’s economic or personal interest regarding the exercise of the takings
power, it is similarly apparent that this factor also weighs in favor of the delegation of
eminent domain power to DNI. In DNI, the interests of it and the community at large,
including landowners and residents, are intertwined. For example, DNI’s stated charge,
which then necessarily guides its interest, is to assemble and to develop vacant land
parcels in the Dudley neighborhood of Boston, for the purpose of primarily constructing
244
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affordable housing for its residents.248

Indeed, the Massachusetts enabling statute

mandates that DNI have revitalization at the core of its mission.249 Therefore, while DNI
may arguably have a self-interested motive to achieve its core mission, this mission and
interest is inherently guided and tempered by the community. Thus, there is little conflict
with DNI’s interest and the larger interest of the Dudley neighborhood.
An analysis of whether or not the delegation is narrow in scope also responds
favorably to the delegation of the takings power to DNI. For instance, while there is no
technical limit on the duration of the eminent domain power of DNI, presumably there is
a practical limit on it, given that there is only a certain amount of land that may be
revitalized in the neighborhood. Moreover, DNI’s power is statutorily limited by BRA’s
delegation of eminent domain power to it.250 BRA could presumably revoke the power
that it has delegated once DNI’s mission of revitalizing the neighborhood has been
accomplished. In addition, DNI is limited to exercising eminent domain power within
the confines of the Dudley neighborhood, and it can only act to use this power in
revitalizing the area. Consequently, DNI is limited in content and subject matter, and this
fourth element weighs in favor of the delegation.
While recognizing that the previously discussed four elements of the modified
Texas Boll Weevil test are likely most important with respect to the delegation of eminent
domain power to private, non-profit actors, this Article is also cognizant that other
elements of the original eight-part Texas test may be invoked in any number of statutes
that delegate the takings power to these non-traditional private actors of eminent
domain.251 Therefore, for purposes of being as comprehensive as possible, this Article
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will also undertake analysis of DNI pursuant to the remaining elements of the original
Texas Boll Weevil test.
First, with respect to the element of the original test encompassing whether or not
the “private delegate’s power is limited to making rules” or simply applying the law to
particular individuals,252 it would appear that this element is inconclusive as applied to
DNI and eminent domain power. DNI’s delegation involves neither making rules nor its
applying the law to certain persons. Second, the inquiry weighs in favor of the delegation
because DNI does not have the power to define criminal acts or to impose criminal
sanctions, another element of the original Texas test. Third, the Texas test similarly
weighs in favor of DNI’s delegation of the takings power, as DNI was specifically
created to assemble vacant land for the DSNI using eminent domain authority, and
arguably it has special qualifications to exercise the power.253 Finally, with respect to the
element of whether or not the legislature has provided adequate standards to the private
delegate in the original Texas test, the Massachusetts legislature and BRA directly and
indirectly have provided standards that guide DNI in the exercise of its taking power. For
example, they have mandated that DNI’s takings power may only be exercised for the
revitalization of the Dudley neighborhood and that any exercise of the takings power that
impinges on residents be counter-balanced with contingency plans for them.254

b. Application of the Lawrence Test to DNI

As applied to a modified form of the Lawrence test, the delegation of eminent
domain power to DNI similarly passes constitutional muster for purposes of procedural
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due process. For example, the first part of the Lawrence inquiry examines the nature and
extent of any conflicts of interest between the private delegate and the public, or at least
those persons affected by the delegate’s choice to exercise its delegation.255 For the
reasons outlined in Part V.C.1. above, it is apparent that there is very little conflict-ofinterest between DNI, when it chooses to exercise its statutorily delegated eminent
domain power, and affected persons, primarily residents and landowners of the Dudley
neighborhood.
Moreover, under the modified version of the Lawrence test advocated in this
Article, that notes that there must be the maximum number of safeguards possible on a
private delegate,256 there are a number of accountability mechanisms on DNI’s exercise
of the takings power from a procedural due process perspective. These controls include
the amount of input and approval that elected officials have on the exercise of this public
power, to the almost equivalent amount that the Dudley community at large has.

2. TMC
a. Applying the Modified Texas Boll Weevil Test to TMC

The first two parts of the initial three-part inquiry of the modified Texas Boll
Weevil test certainly arrive at the conclusion that TMC is a non-profit charitable
corporation, as it is a clear private actor that has been delegated the very public power of
eminent domain.257 In addition, under the modified eight-part Texas Boll Weevil test, the
result is one that weighs against the delegation of the takings power to TMC in the
255
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current version of the enabling statute under procedural due process principles.
Therefore, in comparison to the DNI case study, TMC appears to occupy the opposite end
of the procedural due process spectrum.
For example, under the modified Texas Boll Weevil test, there is little, if any,
meaningful government review of an exercise of eminent domain power by TMC.258
While the enabling statute permits an aggrieved landowner to have a formal hearing
about the contested parcel of land, this hearing is simply to assess the value of the
property by three commissioners appointed by the county.259 Its purpose is not to afford
procedural due process in the sense of constitutionally contesting TMC’s disinterest in
the exercise of the takings power and accountability controls that favor this disinterest.260
Other than this hearing by the judicial branch, however, no other branch of government,
state agency, or branch of municipal or county government has the power to review an
exercise of eminent domain power by TMC.
This lack of governmental oversight is even more telling, given that even when
TMC acquires property though direct purchase, any deed restrictions, or contractual
restrictions on the use of land that run with the land are extinguished, simply by virtue of
this private, non-profit’s eminent domain power.261 Thus, that TMC’s power is hardly
subject to government review, much less meaningful review, appears to weigh “heavily”
against the delegation of eminent domain power to it, much like the result of the
application of this element of the original Texas Boll Weevil test to private landowners
delegated the power to control water quality in FM Properties.262 In addition, this result
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is in marked contrast to that found with respect to DNI, a delegation that includes copious
amounts of direct and indirect meaningful government review.263
Moreover, under the modified version of the Texas Boll Weevil test, the issue of
whether or not affected persons by a taking are adequately represented in the process to
seize the property, similarly weighs against the delegation to TMC. While affected
persons in the DNI case study, both landowners and residents, are seemingly represented
to a large extent and exert influence in a decision by DNI to use the takings power,
persons affected by a similar decision by TMC have little or no representation.264
Arguably, however, the recent amendment to the Texas enabling legislation that
mandates that affected landowners be notified via certified mail, should the organization
purchase or acquire property through eminent domain for a purpose that would not
comport with private deed restrictions, is a step in the direction of providing affected
persons more representation in the decision-making process.265 For instance, this notice
would ostensibly permit aggrieved parties, who may be affected either by the taking of
land or a use of land that is incompatible with its historical use and current surroundings
of the property, to use political activism to compel representation and perhaps influence
in TMC’s decision-making process. On the other hand, there is no guarantee that a
community could accomplish this aim, and there is no certainty attached to its results,
unlike with the Massachusetts enabling legislation. Therefore, this element of the revised
Texas test weighs against the delegation of eminent domain power to TMC.
The portion of the modified Texas test examining whether or not the private
delegate has a pecuniary or personal interest in the exercise of eminent domain power,
also results in an unconstitutional delegation of the takings power pursuant to federal
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procedural due process notions.

For instance, unlike DNI, a private, non-profit

corporation that is heavily rooted in the community and is controlled to a large extent by
the residents of the Dudley neighborhood, TMC’s organizational structure as a non-profit
land management and parking concern to its member institutions inherently serves to
create a clash of interest with communities. This conflict of interests is only enhanced by
the fact that TMC’s board of directors is hidden from view and is unaffiliated with
affected communities.
Proof of this clash is found in the sole instance in which TMC used eminent
domain and outright purchase to acquire real property in a Houston-area neighborhood to
construct a multi-level parking garage. This parking facility was prohibited under the
covenants that limited land use in the neighborhood to residential, single-family
homes.266 Furthermore, despite the fact that the organization used its power of eminent
domain for only one parcel of land,267 and acquired the other parcels of land for the
parking garage through outright purchase, TMC still “used” its eminent domain power to
automatically extinguish the private land covenants, or deed restrictions, on the
purchased parcels that restricted the use of the property.268 Thus, as in FM Properties,
this clash of interests between not only TMC and a targeted landowner, but also a
surrounding community, weighs “heavily” against the delegation of power.269
The final part of the modified Texas Boll Weevil test in the eminent domain
context involves assessing whether or not the private delegation is limited in “duration,
extent, and subject matter.”270 As applied to TMC, this element similarly weighs against
the delegation of eminent domain power to it. For instance, the enabling statute permits
266
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TMC to acquire property through eminent domain and therefore to extinguish private
deed restrictions in adjacent communities in perpetuity. There is little restriction on when
TMC’s delegated power of eminent domain terminates.271 The sole limitation on any
duration of TMC’s exercise of the takings power occurs after the power has been
exercised, in which real property will revert to the original owner if the entity does not
use it for the purposes designated in the enabling statute.272 Furthermore, in contrast to
the larger purpose of revitalizing the Dudley neighborhood for which DNI may use
seized land, the purposes for which TMC may use taken land are extremely broad. These
purposes also do not necessarily fit within a larger goal of community development.
They range from the building of medical facilities used for teaching, research, and patient
care purposes to ancillary or service purposes such as parking, a garbage dump, or even
attractive landscaping.273
Moreover, TMC is authorized to use its statutorily delegated takings power on
any real property that is adjacent to or contiguous to its existing property, however the
property was acquired.274 Thus, the use of eminent domain power to acquire one parcel
of property would then justify the exercise of the takings power on adjacent land sites,
permitting a seemingly endless use of eminent domain and infringement upon applicable
land covenants. Therefore, in stark divergence from the delegation of eminent domain
power to DNI, that limits an exercise of the power to the Dudley neighborhood as long as
BRA permits and for revitalization purposes only,275 the duration, extent, and subject
matter of TMC’s delegation is extremely broad in scope and weighs against the
delegation under procedural due process principles.
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Thus, all four elements of the

modified Texas test weigh against the constitutionality of the delegation of eminent
domain power to TMC, including two that weigh “heavily” against the delegation under
the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in FM Properties.

b. Applying the Original Texas Boll Weevil Test to TMC

Even under a more comprehensive approach of an application of the Texas test,
encompassing the remaining elements of the original Texas Boll Weevil test, the
delegation of eminent domain power to TMC still violates basic notions of procedural
due process. For instance, while TMC, in its application of the takings power, does not
make rules or apply the law to particular to particular individuals, it also is not
empowered to define criminal acts or to impose criminal sanctions on recalcitrant
landowners, two elements, respectively, of the original test.276 Thus, the delegation
weighs in favor of the delegation on the latter factor. On the other hand, it is also
apparent that TMC is not specially qualified or trained to exercise eminent domain
power,277 given that its primary role is as a land management company, not purveyor of
eminent domain power, in contrast to DNI. Furthermore, the Texas legislature provided
little, if any standards that would guide a more disinterested use of eminent domain
power by TMC, another element of the original Texas Boll Weevil test.278 Combining
these results with those of the application of the modified test, a numerical tally indicates
that a majority of the factors weighs against the delegation of the takings power.

c. Applying the Lawrence Test to TMC
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Under a modified Lawrence test, for all of the reasons noted in the application of
the modified version of the Texas Boll Weevil test in Part V.C.2.a. above, it is clear that a
large gap exists between the interests of TMC and affected landowners and residents in
the non-profit’s exercise of eminent domain power.279 Moreover, given the large interest
differential between TMC and surrounding communities and landowners, and the
correspondingly few number of statutory safeguards included in the Texas enabling
legislation, especially in relation to the Massachusetts enabling legislation for DNI, there
are not an appropriate amount of safeguards included in the Texas legislation.

VI. Statutory Solutions
A. A Range of Proposals
As exemplified by the TMC case study, the coercive nature of delegated eminent
domain power increases the opportunities for abuse and self-interested action in the hands
of private delegates operating under little or no accountability mechanisms. Short of
advocating a per se rule against the delegation of eminent domain power to private, nonprofit and charitable corporations, this Article proposes a number of solutions that
legislatures may use to increase public accountability, lessen self-interested action, and
mandate that private, non-profit corporations delegated the takings power comport more
forcefully with fundamental notions of procedural due process and of representative
democracy. In addition, this Article advocates taking a more comprehensive approach to
these statutory solutions, ensuring that a number of accountability safeguards are
included in legislation, as in the Massachusetts/DNI case study, rather than just a single
279
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safeguard. It is also important to remember that, some legislatures, upon a re-visiting of
existing legislation or legislative proposals, may simply forgo a delegation at all, given
the ramifications under procedural due process.
First, an obvious statutory solution is one that is included in the enabling
legislation for the DNI case study, as well as suggested by the amended and original
versions of the Texas Boll Weevil test. This solution involves inclusion of statutory
provisions that mandate that an exercise of eminent domain by a private charitable
corporation be approved by a state agency, a state legislature, or even several offices of
local government. The preference, however, is that officials who are directly elected by
the voting populace must approve a takings exercise.280 For instance, in the case of DNI,
a development project must be approved by three levels of local government: (1) the
Boston city council, (2) the city’s planning board, and (3) BRA.
Furthermore, the idea of ensuring that a private actor’s taking power is submitted
for a review by a governmental office is not unheard of. Indeed, when public utilities or
railroads that have been delegated the takings power chooses to exercise it, they must
often seek approval from a branch of state government.281 In addition, the provisions
allowing for an official who is directly elected to approve an exercise of the takings
power by a private, charitable corporation serve as further assurance that the private
delegate will not take arbitrary, self-interested action that is unaccounted for.
A second legislative solution is to include a damages provision in the enabling
legislation of the delegation for an affected landowner or resident that is harmed by an
280
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exercise of the takings power by a non-profit corporation.282 This largely economic
remedy would go above and beyond any compensation paid to landowners for the value
of their seized land, and in the case of business owners, could include the loss of goodwill
and business losses. The damages could also extend to affected residents, who may not
be landowners, but who are residential or commercial leaseholders. Similarly, damages
could be extended to individuals in a community who are affected by a private, non-profit
corporation’s incompatible use of seized land in an area.283 A third approach is to
mandate standard procedures, such as public hearings to which affected parties such as
landowners, residents, community groups, and representatives of the private, non-profit
corporation would be invited and given reasonable time and notice to air their views
publicly. The mandate of public hearings would ostensibly accompany any delegation of
eminent domain power to a private charitable actor, and they could be held directly
before an elected body that will approve or disapprove an exercise of the takings
delegation, such as in the DNI case study. Hearings could also be conducted before an
advisory body or state agency that will provide recommendations for action to elected
officials who must provide final approval of an exercise of the takings power.
Moreover, not only could these hearings be used to air potentially opposing points
of view related to a private non-profit’s exercise of eminent domain power, but also they
could be used to evaluate and to provide oversight of the charitable corporation’s actions
with respect to ways in which it has dealt with affected persons in the community and for
its plans for the seized land. An example of this sort of oversight is found in the DNI
case study, in which contingency plans for residents and landowners affected by DNI’s
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use of eminent domain must be included in order for the city council and planning board
to approve a revitalization project. Nonetheless, both types of hearings would likely add
a veneer of fairness to an exercise of the takings power by a private non-profit
corporation, especially one that is governed by a board of directors that is shielded from
public scrutiny, such as in the TMC case study.
Still a fourth statutory solution that would counter-balance the effects of private
board of directors’ discussions and meetings that are largely held out of public view and
that are related to the exercise of eminent domain power by a private, non-profit is one
that would mandate that these meetings be subject to a state’s Open Records or Open
Meetings Acts.284 This type of statutory provision may allow elected officials who must
approve a private exercise of eminent domain power, as well as persons affected by its
exercise, to evaluate fully the consequences and justifications of the exercise.
In keeping with this fourth recommended solution, a fifth proposal is to ensure
that the delegation is subject to a state’s Sunset Act, in which there would be a time cap
placed on the exercise of the takings power of perhaps five to ten years.285 This type of
provision specifically addresses whether or not the private actor’s actions are limited in
duration.286
Yet a sixth solution is to include in enabling legislation that the exercise of the
takings power be subject to a state’s equivalent of the Administrative Procedure Act.287
This sort of statutory provision would treat private, charitable corporations in an
equivalent manner to state agencies that also exercise public, coercive powers, injecting a
level of substantive and procedural fairness into a non-profit’s exercise of the takings
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power. It would also have the effect of mandating consistent, proven procedures in an
exercise of eminent domain power.

B. Social Capital Impact Assessments (SCIAs): Opening Up The Process
A seventh legislative solution is to require that private, non-profits perform a
Social Capital Impact Assessment (SCIA), a study that would evaluate the impact of the
exercise of the takings power on a community.288

The idea of SCIAs largely derives

from Environmental Impact Statements (EIS), that are mandated in the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in response to any action by a federal agency that may
have a significant impact on the environment.289 A draft EIS must be made available to
the public early enough in the deliberative process in order for the public to comment
meaningfully on an agency’s decision.290 An agency must then respond to the public’s
comments in a final EIS.291
Although criticized for being too time-consuming, expensive, and unduly
procedurally-oriented,292 the EIS process has been highly successful in opening up the
decision-making process of federal agencies to previously disempowered community and
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environmental groups concerning determinations of these agencies that may significantly
impact the physical environment.293 Indeed, EISs have been instrumental in forcing the
redesign, reconsideration, or even withdrawal of decisions of federal agencies that
severely impact the environment.294

The result has been to provide a framework for

public debate concerning environmental decision-making that previously was nonexistent.295
In the eminent domain arena, SCIAs have been recommended as a way to involve
and to empower oft-neglected community groups and individuals who are impacted by
economic

development

takings

environmental/NEPA context.296

using

a

similar

process

to

EISs

in

the

SCIAs could be mandated either through enabling

legislation or through the courts. They would assess the social impact of an economic
development taking on a community by compelling the response of a governmental entity
and its private partners to 14 questions that address community concerns. These studies
would also be provided to the public early enough for reasonable notice and comment by
the public.

Therefore, the idea is that, as in the environmental context, economic

development takings would similarly be opened up.297 The relevant 14 questions are as
follows:
1.
How will the taking or development project disrupt
existing land uses?;

293

See Lynton K. Caldwell, Beyond NEPA: Future Significance of the National Environmental Policy Act, 22
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 205, 207 (1998); see also MacMillan, supra note 290, at 529.
294
See Caldwell, supra note 293, at 207. For instance, the EIS process was instrumental in halting projects that
affected old-growth forests and the northern spotted owl. See Thomas Sander, Environmental Impact Statements
and
Their
Lessons
for
Social
Capital
Analysis,
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/saguaro/pdfs/sandereisandsklessons.pdf at 2 (last visited on Dec. 15, 2005) (citing
Mark Bonnet & Mark Zimmerman, Politics and Preservation: The Endangered Species Act and the Northern
Spotted Owl, ECOLOGY L.Q. 105-71 (1991), and Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479 (D. Wash.
1988) (halting attempts to log the habitat of the northern spotted owl after it was declared a threatened species by
the Fish & Wildlife Service)).
295

See Johnson, supra note 288, at ____.
See id., supra note 288 at _____.
297
See id.
296
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2.
How will the taking or development affect
neighborhood integrity?;
3.
Will the taking or revitalization project displace and
relocate homes, families, and businesses?;
4.
What opposition, if any, exists to the taking or
project?;
5.
If neighborhood integrity is to be affected or the
taking or revitalization project is to displace homes,
families, and businesses, how can these effects be
mitigated?;
6.
If displacement and relocation identified in
Question Three occur, how many homes, families, and
businesses will be relocated?;
7.
If displacement and relocation occur, how many
opportunities will there be for displaced residents to occupy
space in the new development as a home or as a small
business?;298
8.
If there is no plan to have displaced residents
occupy space in the new development as a home or as a
small business, what proposals do the relevant government
entities have to relocate residents or small business owners
to an equivalent site?;
9.
What is the economic impact of the displacement of
these homes, families, and businesses on the city and
state’s purse, in the form of lost real property and sales
taxes, jobs generated by small businesses that may be
displaced, and revenues generated by these businesses?;
10.
What is the ethnic and racial breakdown of the
families who may be displaced?;
11.
What is the promised economic impact of the
takings, in terms of employment opportunities and tax
revenue gained?;
12.
Is the promised economic impact referred to in
Question Eleven realistic and practical, in light of other
potentially uncontrollable factors, such as the availability of
financing for the project, key tenants and institutions that
298

Housing provisions in the new development plan for some of the displaced residents in Berman were
specifically noted by the Court in that case. Berman, 348 U.S. at 30-31. At least one-third of the new residential
units were to be “low-rent housing with a maximum rent of $17 per room per month.” Id.
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may occupy the project, or the economic health of these
key tenants?;
13.
What ties, if any, do the private entities that stand to
gain from the economic development project have with any
state or local governments exercising eminent domain or
promulgating legislation in support of its exercise?; and
14.
What alternatives exist to placing the economic
development project in the proposed site?299
There is no reason, however, that SCIAs could not be expanded to go beyond
economic development takings and to provide a global statutory solution to takings in
general, especially those by private, non-profit actors delegated this power. Statutorily
implemented SCIAs would likely address the legislative or due process concerns of
PNDD and the Texas Boll Weevil and Lawrence tests by essentially injecting public input
and a measure of accountability into the takings decisions of private non-profit delegates.
For instance, in the NEPA/environmental arena, EISs are often made available to public
officials for their public comments.300 By mandating that SCIAs concerning a private,
non-profit entity’s use of its delegated takings power be provided to pertinent elected
officials, and subsequently providing a forum for officials to respond and to comment on
a non-profit’s proposed action, affected communities would be afforded a golden
opportunity to determine their representatives’ stance on a proposed taking.
Communities could then subsequently decide their agreement with this stance on Election
day. At a minimum, however, this Article recommends that SCIAs be included as part
of the “record” before elected officials or before advisory groups to elected officials that
have final say over a non-profit’s exercise of the takings power.

299
300

Johnson, supra note 288, at _____.
See Caldwell, supra note 293, at 207; see also MacMillan, supra note 290, at 519-20.
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VII. Conclusion
In an era in which many services are privatized by government, from prisons to
war, it is no surprise that the privatization movement would inevitably extend to the
traditionally governmental, very public and coercive power of eminent domain. Having
escaped the harsh scrutiny that followed the Court’s Kelo decision and that upheld
economic development takings that benefit for-profit private parties, takings by private,
non-profit and charitable corporations merit, however, equal concern. These entities
often operate in the shadows of governmental and electoral oversight and are largely
governed by privately shielded boards of directors.
This Article advocates that the Private Non-Delegation Doctrine, a doctrine that
remains alive and well in state courts, and that is based upon fundamental notions of
procedural due process and of representative democracy, provides an excellent basis for
assessing the exercise of the takings power by private, non-profit corporations. The
version of the Private Non-Delegation Doctrine supported in this paper suggests that
private, non-profit actors with coercive power, such as the takings power, should be
required to act in a disinterested manner through a number of proposed accountability
mechanisms, including holding elected officials accountable for the takings decisions of
these entities.
Moreover, the Doctrine is embodied in two tests that are discussed and ultimately
modified in this Article for use in non-traditional private delegations of eminent domain
power. These tests include the Texas Boll Weevil case used by the Texas Supreme Court
to evaluate private delegations of power, as well as one proposed by Professor David
Lawrence. Both tests, however, highlight the importance of accountability measures and
disinterested action by a private delegate, the two underlying concerns related to
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procedural due process and American representative democracy in the Private NonDelegation Doctrine.
Using the original and modified versions of the Texas Boll Weevil and Lawrence
tests, two case studies of private, non-profit and charitable corporations delegated
eminent domain power, the Dudley Neighborhood Initiative, Inc. in Boston,
Massachusetts, and the Texas Medical Center in Houston, Texas, are examined. Analysis
of these case studies reveals that they occupy opposite poles of the Private NonDelegation continuum from a procedural due process perspective.
To address the procedural due process concerns stressed by the Private NonDelegation Doctrine and the need for appropriate accountability safeguards and
mechanisms, this Article advocates seven legislative solutions that may be included in
enabling legislation for these types of delegation. Short of establishing a per se rule
against the delegation of eminent domain to private, non-profit corporations, these
solutions, in a time where privatization is a popular panacea for a number of ills, may
provide a cure to the pinctures of procedural due process that may result when the very
public power of eminent domain is delegated to private, non-profit corporations.
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